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NOTE
RETROACTIVITY AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The resolution of contemporary problems depends, inevitably, upon
past experience; the two cannot and should not be divorced. The proper
use of the past is in projection-as an aid to our understanding of the
present and our formulation of hopes for the future. A great danger lies
in reversing this process-in projecting contemporary problems and atti-
tudes backward in time in an effort to reevaluate past behavior which is
susceptible to misinterpretation unless viewed in its original setting. Some
distortion of the past may be harmless: does it really matter whether the
racoon coat was in fact a staple of the collegiate male wardrobe a generation
ago? Indeed, some may be beneficial: our apotheosis of hardheaded poli-
ticians of another age as "founding Fathers" may lend a needed inviolability
to institutions born of early political compromise. But if the current
attitudes which we project back are a product of anxiety or desperation
about a real and present threat to our personal and political security, such
distortion can be ominous.
In recent years the federal and state governments, alarmed by the
international Communist movement, have enacted a number of security and
loyalty programs which regulate association and speech. Few will deny
that eliminating the internal Communist menace is a desirable end. And,
although the dissenters have persisted in challenging many of the means
used, a majority of the Supreme Court have held that the Communist
Party is, to some extent, constitutionally amenable to control.' They have
established that Congress does not offend the first amendment by making
conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of the government-a classic
Communist doctrine-a criminal offense.2 Nominal membership in the
Party, even with knowledge of its aims, is not yet a crime per se,3 but it
may subject the actor to many disabilities which have been sustained in
the face of first amendment challenge.4  Thus we have an area in
1 In one of the latest cases in this line of decisions, the Supreme Court last term
affirmed an order of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring the Communist
Party to register under § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat 993
(1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958). Communist Party v. Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
2 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Compare Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
3 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961); cf. Killian v. United
States, 82 Sup. Ct. 302, 315 (1961).
4 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
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which association and speech may be controlled in consonance with the
Constitution.5
It is in this exceptional area that most of the retroactive governmental
action has come. It is here, where many actions may have seemed con-
stitutionally privileged when they were performed, that the consequences
of misunderstanding past action may be gravest. In today's climate of opin-
ion it is easy to forget that in the 1930's the Communist Party was treated
in many ways as just another political party 6 and that Communist activities
were judged by the "clear and present danger" test.7  The change in
attitude 8 is not merely one which contains potential unfairness in attaching
U.S. 485 (1952) ; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam) ;
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; Nelson
v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
Although the substantive question is clearly settled in favor of constitutionality, there
are limits, see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952),
and the Court has insisted upon procedural fairness and strict statutory construction,
see Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961) ; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961) ; Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 520 (1958); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958) ; Rowoldt v. Perfetto,
355 U.S. 115 (1957). But see Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
For a recent state case exhibiting strict control over the application of such enact-
ments, see Lowenstein v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 35 N.J. 94, 171 A.2d 265 (1961),
reversing a board dismissal of a teacher for refusal to answer questions as to past
Party association.
6 Recent cases involving first amendment freedoms in contexts other than the
Communist problem indicate that a double standard may be operative. Compare
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961), with
Louisiana ex rel. GremiIlion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). Compare Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), with Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
0 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275, 280 (1961) ; Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 & n.14 (1957).
7 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ; see Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (by implication);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164-65 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally
CHAFFE, FREE SPEEC H IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) (defending); MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (criticizing) ; BERNS,
FREEDoM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48-72 (1957); HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 58-61 (1958). Today the test, if not abandoned with respect to the evaluation
of the actions of Communists, has at least had the element of immediacy removed.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (plurality opinion) : "Peti-
tioners intended to overthrow the Government of the United States as speedily as
the circumstances would permit. Their conspiracy . . . created a 'clear and present
danger' of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence." See id.
at 542-43 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Jackson was of the opinion
that the test was not designed for, nor could it properly be applied to, cases such as
Dennis which required the appraisal of "imponderables!
' Instead, he "would have
saved it, unmodified, for application as a 'rule of reason' in the kind of case for which
it was devised. . . [involving] a hot-headed speech on a street corner, or circulation of
a few incendiary pamphlets. . . ." Id. at 568-70 (concurring opinion). Compare
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
8 In contrast to the clear and present danger rationale, language in some of the
recent cases involving legislative control of the Communist Party and its members
suggests that the legislative judgment is not to be disturbed on such matters-a
position very similar to that taken on economic "substantive due proces' questions.
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present significance to what may have been innocent conduct.9 If current
legislation is permitted to disadvantage a past Party member, a precedent
is created for the future. The danger lies in our experience with the
Communists being such that it may be used by a future generation with
different enemies than ours as a precedent for sustaining similar retro-
activity ' in connection with persons who are engaged in activities which
today are considered to be protected by the first amendment.
See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 94-95 (1961)
(upholding the registration provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, § 7, 64 Stat. 993, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958)) :
It is not for the courts to re-examine the validity of these legislative find-
ings and reject them. . . .They are the product of extensive investigation
by Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 516, 530 [1934]. We certainly cannot dismiss
them as unfounded or irrational imaginings... .And if we accept them,
as we must, as a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat
which Communist organizations pose not only to existing government in the
United States, but to the United States as a sovereign, independent nation-
if we accept as not wholly unsupportable the conclusion that those organi-
zations "are not free and independent organizations, but are sections of a
world-wide Communist organization and are controlled, directed, and subject
to the discipline of the Communist dictatorship of [a] . . . foreign country,"
§ 2(5) -we must recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist
organization of that nature is extensive.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), is an even stronger example of such
deference. See note 66 infra. On the impropriety of judicial inquiry regarding the
motives of legislative committee investigations, see Wilkinson v. United States, 365
U.S. 399, 412 (1961) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1959).
With this approach compare the thinking of the Court in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937):
[Freedom of speech, press, and assembly] may be abused by using speech
or press or assembly to incite to violence and crime. The people through
their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legis-
lative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with
the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the
importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the over-
throw of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the
need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press
and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political dis-
cussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
Cf. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943):
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness
of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the
First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example,
a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "ra-
tional basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the state may lawfully protect.
9 Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
10 Retroactivity is here defined as official action attaching detrimental conse-
quences to conduct occurring prior to the legislation, investigation, or administrative
determination. Other definitions of the term are found in Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692
(1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Law-
making, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216-20 (1960) ; Smith, Retroactive Law and Vested Rights,
5 TExAs L. Ray. 231-33 (1927).
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The effect of such action on first amendment freedoms is an issue
which has received little judicial attention. This lack of development may
be explained in large measure by two factors: first, the Supreme Court has
used other grounds to dispose of cases presenting the problem; " and,
second, lawmakers have been understandably hesitant to enact such legis-
lation.' 2  This attitude stems from an ancient distrust of retroactivity in
any form 13 and undoubtedly draws some strength from the constitutional
mandates against retrospective penal laws-the ex post facto and bill of
attainder clauses.14 For these reasons, activities on the periphery of the
first amendment have not often been the subject of retroactive governmental
action. It is not surprising that the few exceptions are almost all in the
area of investigation and legislation dealing with Communists and sus-
pected Communists.' 5 In the past, the attitude of the public-assuming an
awareness of the problem-towards many of the minority groups involved
in first amendment cases has been one of sympathy or indifference. In
contrast, few if any Americans have not been exposed to the issue of
"Communism"; the threat posed by the international Communist move-
ment is manifest to a very large and diverse audience. The urge to repress
has been correspondingly great; and when translated into legislation,'6 it
1 1 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613-21 (1960) (reaching the
issue of retroactivity but treating it, not in terms of the first amendment, but rather
in terms of the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses) ; Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating Oklahoma's loyalty oath legislation for want of
a scienter requirement). In a few opinions the Court seems to have had to convince
itself, consciously and sometimes with difficulty, that there was no retrospectivity on
the facts presented. See Flemming v. Nestor, supra; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
12For example, after the Supreme Court invalidated Oklahoma's loyalty oath,
which demanded a disavowal of subversive associations in the five years preceding
the taking of the oath, Okla. Laws 1951, tit. 51, ch. 1, §§ 1-9, for lack of an element
of scienter, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the state legislature, although
insisting on an oath of some sort for public employees, not only added a requirement
of knowing membership, but also gave the oath prospective effect only. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 36.1-.6 (Supp. 1960).
13 "The bias against retroactive legislationf' was incorporated into the English
common law from Roman and Greek sources by Bracton and given currency by Coke
as a rule of statutory construction. American courts early adopted it and used it
also as a limitation on legislative power. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive
Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. Rxv. 775 (1936).
14 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (limitations on Congress); U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (limitations on the states).
15 But see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The deportation laws contain
many instances of retroactive operation, some of which deal with aliens other than
"subversives" or Communists. E.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Mc-
Carran-Walter Act), §241(a) (11), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11) (1958) ;
see Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957) ; Lehmann v. United States ex rel.
Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
16 Attacks on the wisdom of legislation exemplifying this attitude have been
frequent, See, e.g., CHAPEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIERTY 64-252 (1956) ; GELLEOgR,
AiNERICAN RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTION IN ACTION 41-131 (1960); O'Brian, New
Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 HAixv. L. REV. 1 (1952). Many pages in
the United States Reports also make the point. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82, 97 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958)
(Black, J., concurring) ; Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 412 (1958) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 553-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Compare the more conservative ideas in BERs, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 198-227.
398 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
has been upheld by the courts.17 The occurrence of retroactivity in this
pattern of legislation and investigation poses special constitutional problems.
This Note will attempt to state and evaluate them in terms of the first
amendment.
I. SCOPE OF THE TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
At the outset it is important to trace the constitutional limitations on
retroactivity which are not likely to afford protection 18 against the great
majority of contemporary statutes which attach current significance to past
association or speech. The traditional prohibitions fall into two categories:
the ex post facto and bill of attainder provisions, which operate upon crim-
inal or "penal" legislation, and the contract clause 19 and due process of law
requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which protect
"vested" property rights.
A. Limitations on Legislative Punishment-Ex Post Facto
and Bill of Attainder
Some jurists have insisted that the constitutional convention intended
the ex post facto clauses to ban all retrospective laws.2 0 Although there is
17 See, e.g., cases collected note 4 vupra.
Neither the spirit of liberty nor the spirit of repression is ever totally ab-
sent from the American scene. . . . The most striking fact in the relation
of the history of repressions to the history of judicial review in particular
or to the Supreme Court in general is that no direct action by the Court has
ever had any significant bearing in either stopping or slowing a repression.
. The dominant lesson of our history in the relation of the judiciary to
repressions is that courts love liberty most when it is under pressure least.
Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 113-14
(Cahn ed. 1954). See BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON 386-407 (1925) (discussing
intolerant judicial action in the Alien and Sedition Act cases) ; CEAFEE, FREE SPEEcH
IN THE UNITED STATES 74-79 (1941) (Espionage and Sedition Act cases); cf.
ScHEMER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATIoN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1917-1921, at 43
(1960) : "The federal Judiciary-termed 'hysterical' by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
-proved to be highly immoderate in passing on Espionage and Sedition Act cases.
Jurymen were reported by one judge to have regarded verdicts of guilty as a means
of demonstrating their own loyalty."
18 This is not to say they cannot provide protection. United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946), Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872), Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277 (1867), applying the bill of attainder or ex post facto clauses, are
exceptions from the past in which retroactive legislation impinging on first amend-
ment rights has been held unconstitutional. The Court in recent years has not been
quick to invoke the broad definition of "punishment" provided by Cummings v.
Missouri, supra at 320, 327. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21
(1960). Compare the Court's unanimous overeagerness to protect property interests
in Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878), in which it used the ex post facto clause
to invalidate a retroactive application of a tobacco tax increase, when the same result
could have been reached by statutory construction.
19 See generally Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1-3),
57 HARv. L. REV. 512, 621, 852 (1944).
20 For an early view, see the appendix to Mr. Justice Johnson's concurring
opinion in Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 414, 681 (1829). For a
recent view, drawing on contemporary opinion, see Crosskey, The True Meaning of
the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. CEL L. Rxv. 539 (1947).
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some history to support this broad reading, the evidence pointing to a
narrower view is at least as strong,21 and the familiar case of Calder v.
Bull 22 interpreted the phrase as applying only to penal laws. 23  In the
language of Mr. Justice Chase:
The prohibition . . . is an additional bulwark in favor of the
personal security of the subject, to protect his person from punish-
ment by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do
not think it was inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights
of either property or contracts.
24
Although his hornbook dictum outlining the four types of ex post facto
laws speaks only of criminal statutes,25 the clauses have not been construed
so narrowly.2 6  In Cummings v. Missouri 27 and Ex parte Garland,28 the
Court, reviewing the Missouri 29 and federal test oath provisions," held
21 Compare 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 448-49, 617
(1911), and 3 id. at 328, with 2 id. at 375-76, 440, and 3 id. at 100. The Federalist is
inconclusive, although it can be read as accommodating the broader interpretation.
See 1 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 307 (Dunne ed. 1901) (Madison).
223 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
2 3 Id. at 390. Professor Crosskey asserts that the result of the case was influenced
by the pressing need for a bankruptcy law, still unenacted in 1798. This fact was
brought home to the Court, says Crosskey, by financial embarrassment of one of
their colleagues, Mr. Justice Wilson, who found it necessary to be riding circuit in
"far-away North Carolina" when Calder was decided. See Crosskey, supra note 20,
at 560-63.
24 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
25 Ibid. :
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and
the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before
the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish-
ment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
28Even Mr. Justice Chase did not purport to be exhaustive: "All these, and
similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive." Id. at 391. (Emphasis added.)
2771 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
2871 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
29The Missouri constitution demanded that appointed public officers, lawyers,
and clergymen swear that they had not been Confederate sympathizers at any
time in the past. Mo. CoxsT. art. II, §§ 3, 6, 7, 14 (1865). Cummings, a Roman
Catholic priest, had been convicted in the Missouri courts of preaching without having
taken the oath. Another state statute, West Virginia's requirement that the previously
unqualified privilege of nonresident petition to reopen judgment be available only to
petitioners who had taken a similar test oath, was laconically voided by the Court in
Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872).
Do In 1865 Congress passed a statute requiring lawyers of the federal bar to
swear that they had not aided the South nor held any office in Confederate govern-
ments. Act of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424. Garland, who had been admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court in 1860, had served in the Confederate Senate.
Unable to take the new oath, he petitioned to be allowed to continue his federal
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that legislation which is essentially punitive cannot escape the prohibition
merely by being cast in civil form. These cases relied not only on the
constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws, but on the bill of attainder
clauses. "They stand for the proposition," said a later Court, "that legis-
lative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals
or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder pro-
hibited by the Constitution." 31 The test, then, under both the bill of
attainder and ex post facto provisions, is whether a noncriminal enactment
levies "punishment" in some constitutional sense.32  Obviously, this effect
will seldom be stamped on the face of a statute; 33 the court must draw the
punitive purpose from legislative history 34 or, by negative implication, from
a lack of any other purpose which a statute might serve.3 5 The search for
practice, asserting that the act was unconstitutional. The statute had enjoyed little
success previously in the lower federal courts. See Ex parte Law, 15 Fed. Cas. 3
(No. 8126) (D.C.S.D. Ga. 1866); In re Baxter, 2 Fed. Cas. 1043 (No. 1118) (C.C.
E.D. Tenn. 1866); In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16 (No. 12811) (D.C.D. Ala. 1865).
$1 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946) (Black, J.).
32 Compare United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), with Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951). Compare Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), with Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). The
concept of "punishment" for bill of attainder purposes is said not to include dis-
abilities imposed because the legislature has ground to believe that past action will
give rise to future conduct which it may lawfully proscribe, as contrasted with penal-
ties prescribed directly for past actions. See American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413-14 (1950) (denial of NLRA benefits to unions whose
officers failed to submit "noncommunist" affidavits), criticized in Wormuth, Legis-
lative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND. L. Rzv. 603, 615-18 (1951);
Comment, The Constitutional Prohibition of Bills of Attainder: A Waning Guaranty
of Jitdicial Trial, 63 YAix L.J. 844, 851-61 (1954). Both commentators stress the
lack of judicial determination in identifying the class affected by the Donds-type
oath. On this basis they distinguish Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898),
where the Court upheld a disqualification from practicing medicine based on prior
judicial conviction of a felony.
33 According to Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 844, 845-46 (1954), the attainder in
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), is the sole example in which an Ameri-
can legislature, since the adoption of the Constitution, has gone so far as to name
names. The abortive attempt by the House of Representatives to deport Harry
Bridges contained all of the necessary elements of a bill of attainder on its face:
"[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law the Attorney General . . . is hereby
authorized and directed to take into custody forthwith and deport forthwith to
Australia, the country of which he is a citizen or subject, the alien, Harry Renton
Bridges, whose presence in this country the Congress deems hurtful." H.R. 9766,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). The Attorney General, in reply to a request by Senate
Committee on Immigration for his opinion on the bill's constitutionality, stated that
he thought it unconstitutional. The Committee then suggested an amendment, merely
calling for an investigation of Bridges. S. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
4 See United States v. Lovett, supra note 33, at 308-13; Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
35 See Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 34; Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 234 (1872) (by implication); cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958)
(plurality opinion). These cases, in which the Court had to go behind the statute,
are distinguishable from cases involving enactments which are plainly criminal in
form and may be subject to invalidation or attack on ex post facto grounds. See
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894);
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) ; Gut v. The State, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1870) ;
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a hidden punitive intent is ticklish judicial business, and the Supreme Court
has seldom invalidated "civil" legislation on the basis of finding a legisla-
tive design to punish. 6 Likewise, the Court has seldom been at a loss to
discover some legitimate, nonpenal purpose; 3 7 the constitutionally permis-
sible ends of legislation are numerous, and the mere fact that some person
may be disadvantaged, because of his previous conduct, by the operation of
a legislative program which might be said to serve one of these ends does
not render a statute punitive so as to invoke the ex post facto and bill of
attainder prohibitions.3 8
B. Limitations on Legislative Deprivation of Property--The Contract
Clause and Due Process of Law
Constitutional problems have also been generated by legislation which
is retroactive only in the sense that it presently takes property that was
acquired in the past. This type of nonpenal retroactive legislation has had
a checkered history in American law.39 Some of the early opinions contain
language indicating that statutory impairment of previously vested rights
is inherently so unjust as to violate the superconstitutional precepts of
natural law.4 D With the ex post facto avenue closed,41 the antagonism to
Wey Him Fong v. United States, 287 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 971
(1961); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1960); Graham v. Thompson,
246 R.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957); Mafnas v. Guam, 228 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1955);
Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955).
36 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), is the only recent example. In
the amazing majority opinion in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), Mr.
Justice Harlan rejected the argument that congressional termination of Social Security
benefits to an alien deported as a former Communist revealed a punitive intent. His
rebuttal was rested, in part, on the fact that, in supposed contrast, the Court in
Cummings had a "first-hand acquaintance with . . . 'the fierce passions'" aroused
by the Civil War. Id. at 615. This argument implies either that the majority is
unaware of similar passions in the last decade-which is admittedly untenable-or
that they do not believe this to have been the significant factor in the passage of the
statute, which is at least questionable.
3 7 Two of the rare exceptions are Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality
opinion), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
3
8 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) ; De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144
(1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Borrow v. FCC,
285 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960).
89 The early developments are traced in Smead, Yupra note 13. Two recent
studies are Hochman, supra note 10; Slawson, supra note 10.
40 See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50-51, 52 (1815):
We have no knovldge of any authority or principle which could support
the doctrine, that a legislative grant is revocable in its own nature ....
Such a doctrine . . . is utterly inconsistent with a great and fundamental
principle of a republican government, the right of the citizens to the free enjoy-
ment of their property legally acquired. . . . [W]e think ourselves standing
upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every
free government, upon the spirit and the letter of the constitution of the
United States, and upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals,
in resisting such a doctrine.
See Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. R. 477, 501-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
41 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); notes 22-25 supra and
accompanying text
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civil retroactivity may have also found expression in the generous reading
given the contract clause.42 But the early decisions did not condemn all
retrospective civil legislation unconditionally; from the outset it was recog-
nized that the public good might sometimes require such enactments 43 and
that some interests affected thereby must bow to the general welfare.44
This recognition exists today, affirmed by modem cases upholding this
form of retroactivity when it is necessary to achieve permissible legisla-
tive 45 or administrative 46 goals. The constitutional area of the law-
makers' competence to alter proprietary interests is limited by the talis-
manic concept of "vested" property rights; 47 divestiture of interests which
may be so labeled is a deprivation of property without due process
of law.48 But no invalidating decisions have been placed on this ground in
42 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Mr. Justice Johnson complained of this development
in his essay on the ex post facto clause appended to his concurring opinion in Satterlee
v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 414, 681, 685-86 (1829).
43 See, e.g., Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221-22 (1822);
Boston & Gunby v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102, 107 (1854).
4 4 See, e.g., Wynne's Lesse v. Wynne 2 Swan. 405> 409-13 (Tenn. 1852).
45 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); City
of Ann Arbor v. Northwest Park Constr. Corp., 280 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1960) (zoning
ordinances) ; Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948) (upholding the constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act
of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1958)).
46 See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944);
Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(upholding NLRB's retroactive application of revised contract bar term).
47 But what kinds of rights are "vested" in this context?
One's first impulse on undertaking to discuss retroactive laws and vested
rights is to define a vested right. But when it appears, as soon happens, that
this is impossible, one decides to fix the attention upon retroactive laws and
leave the matter of definition to follow rather than precede the discussion,
assuming for the purpose that a right is vested when it is immune to destruc-
tion, and that it is not vested when it is liable to destruction, by retroactive
legislation. The simplification of the task which this plan seems to involve,
turns out to be something of an illusion, however, when it appears, as also
soon happens, that one's preconceived notions of retroactive laws are irrecon-
cilable with the data with which one has to deal.
Smith, supra note 10, at 231.
Supplementing this general doctrine, a number of other formalisms have developed.
Thus, a "curative" statute is allowed, United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370
(1907) ; the legislature may alter "remedies" but not "rights," Campbell v. Holt,
115 U.S. 620 (1885) ; "statutory rights" are subject to divestment, Flanigan v. Sierra
County, 196 U.S. 553 (1905); "gratuities," Dodge v. Board of Educ, 302 U.S. 74
(1937), and "privileges," Maricopa County v. Valley Natl Bank, 31 U.S. 357
(1943), may be withdrawn.
48 See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942); Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) ; Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931) ; Unter-
myer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927);
Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922); Ochoa v.
Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148
(1913).
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recent years.49  This may be explained by two developments: an increased
reliance by governments on achieving change through techniques which call
for compensation rather than reliance on the police power,50 and the federal
judiciary's abdication of "substantive due process" review to defend prop-
erty rights.51 Not surprisingly, the other constitutional sanctuary for
vested interests, the contract clause, has also become obsolete.
52
C. The Unprotected Area
The traditional constitutional doctrines attempt to meet two very
different needs. The now untended fence around blue-ribbon property
interests was designed to preserve the status quo from legislative disrup-
tion. In contrast, the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses have been
shaped to ask not what an individual is losing, but why he is losing it.
These safeguards have been judicially defined in terms which do not
affect modem retroactive legislation.53 Thus, an alien has no absolute right
to remain in the country; 54 nor has anyone a vested right to a government
pension,5 5 a radio license from the FCC,56 primary social security bene-
49 Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 637, 640 (1961). But cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (invalidating
economic regulation under the equal protection clause).
50 Compare Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), zwith Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
51 See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ; United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The
degree of present judicial restraint is indicated by Mr. Justice Murphy's language in
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949) : "We cannot say
that South Carolina is not entitled to call the funeral insurance business an evil.
Nor can we say that the statute has no relation to the elimination of those evils.
There our inquiry must stop." To the same effect is Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). See HAND, THE BILL. OF RIGHTS 43-45 (1958) ; KAuPER,
FROXTIERS OF CONSTITu IONAL LIBmR 34-37 (1956). The doctrine retains vitality
in some state courts. See, e.g., Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d
634 (1954); Gwynette v. Meyers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d 673 (1960). See generally
Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
Nw. U.L. REv. 226 (1958).
52 THE CoxNSnTUTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmImacA 362 (Corwin ed. 1953).
Professor Corwin attributes this decline to two distinct factors: the use of the due
process clause in situations where the contract clause might apply, and, more recently,
the subordination of contract rights to the police power.
53 It is possible that the two concepts may overlap in some instances. See, e.g.,
Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590, 592, 594 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (Laramore, J.,
holding 68 Stat. 1142, 5 U.S.C. §2283(a) (1958) unconstitutional on, inter alia,
bill of attainder grounds; Whitaker, J., concurring, finding that the statute deprived
the plaintiff of a vested right in annuity benefits) ; In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16
(No. 12811) (D.C.D. Ala. 1865). They were both argued (unsuccessfully) in
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
5 4 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584-88 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) ; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
598, 610 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case).
55 Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937) ; Rafferty v. United States, 210
F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954). But see Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590, 594
(Ct. Cl. 1958) (Whitaker, J., concurring).
56 See Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892
(1960).
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fits, 57 veteran's disability payments,58 the practice of a profession,59 or
public employment 60 -whether it be teaching school 61 or closing doors on
subway trains.62 Furthermore, since the current mass of loyalty legisla-
tion 63 and the deportation laws announce themselves not as punish-
ment, but as regulation 4 or an exercise of "inherent sovereign power," 65
and since the relevance of past conduct to a valid statutory purpose
is usually accepted,6 6 there is little chance of successfully objecting
5 7 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960) ; Price v. Flemming, 280 F.2d
956 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817 (1961). Compare Stark, Social Secur-
ity: Its Importance to Lawyers, 43 A.B.A.J. 319 (1957), with Wollenberg, Vested
Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37 ORE. L. REv. 299 (1958).
58 Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal disnissed, 365
U.S. 465 (1961).
59 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961); see Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114 (1889). But see In the Matter of Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A2d
835 (1961).
60 See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918
(1951). Much has been made of Mr. Justice Holmes' aphorism in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892): "The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman." Consider Mr. justice Douglas' qualification in Barsky v. Board of
Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472-73 (1954) (dissenting opinion): "The dictum of Holmes
gives a distortion to the Bill of Rights. It is not an instrument of dispensation but
one of deterrents. Certainly a man has no affirmative right to any particular job or
skill or occupation. The Bill of Rights does not say who shall be doctors or lawyers
or policemen. But it does say that certain rights are protected, that certain things
shall not be done. And so the question here is not what government must give, but
rather what it may not take away."
61 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; see Beilan v. Board of Educ.,
357 U.S. 399 (1958).
62 See Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
6 3 In 1956 it was found that such programs had already touched one out of every
five gainfully employed individuals in the United States. GELEORN, INDIVMUAL
FRDOM AND GOVERNmENTAL RESTRAINT 105 (1956).
64 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), discussed in note 36 supra.
65 See note 81 infra. Many commentators have voiced objection to the Court's
deportation-is-not-punishment theme. See, e.g., Boudin, The Settler Within Our
Gates: III, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 634 (1951); Bullitt, Deportation as a Denial of Sub-
stantive Due Process, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 205 (1953); Maslow, Recasting Our De-
portation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1956). However,
the Supreme Court has consistently stated that it is bound by past decisions holding
the ex post facto clause inapplicable. E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
594-95 (1952). In the second part of a carefully developed argument that there are
constitutional limits on congressional power to deport the long-term resident alien,
Siegfried Hesse demonstrates that the Court is not so precedent-tied on this point as
they seem to think. Hesse, The Constitutional Statics of the Lawfully Admitted
Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power To Expel, 69 YALE
L.J. 262, 276-90 (1959).
66 The Court is sometimes easily persuaded that a reasonable relation exists. An
outstanding recent example is Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The ques-
tion was the constitutionality of terminating petitioner's Social Security benefits be-
cause he was deported for past membership in the Communist Party. See notes
212-22 infra and accompanying text. Despite the first amendment implications of
the case (efficiently dispatched in a footnote of the majority opinion, 363 U.S. at 613
n.7), the Court foreshadowed the answer to the due process question of reasonableness
by stressing that "we must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought
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to these disabilities on ex post facto or bill of attainder grounds.6 7
Of course, it cannot be denied that past conduct may have a legitimate
bearing on present qualifications.es Few would find it capricious for the
medical profession to reject an applicant who has previously performed
abortions-even if this standard for disqualification was established after
the acts had been done.6 9 Similarly, the provision of New York's Water-
front Commission Act that no union may collect dues so long as it has
a felon among its officers and agents 7 -- a harsh rule if it disqualifies an
officer whose only criminality is a thirty-three year old conviction for grand
larceny 71 -finds ample support in the notorious history of racketeer in-
fluence on waterfront hiring.72
The relevance of past activity is not conjured away by the first amend-
ment considerations which are raised by the security programs and certain
to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,
utterly lacking in rational justification:' Id. at 611. The relationship advanced by
the Court, id. at 612, speaks for itself:
One benefit which may be thought to accrue to the economy from the
Social Security system is the increased over-all national purchasing power
resulting from taxation of productive elements of the economy to provide
payments to the retired and disabled, who might otherwise be destitute or
nearly so, and who would generally spend a comparatively large percentage
of their benefit payments. This advantage would be lost as to payments
made to one residing abroad. For these purposes, it is, of course, constitu-
tionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative
decision, as it is irrelevant that the section does not extend to all to whom
the postulated rationale might in logic apply. . . . Nor, apart from this,
can it be deemed irrational for Congress to have concluded that the public
purse should not be utilized to contribute to the support of those deported
on the grounds specified in the statute.
For another example of judicial dexterity-although it failed to achieve majority
support-see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
discussed at notes 232-40 infra and accompanying text.
67 The Supreme Court has not invalidated a "civil" statute on either of these con-
stitutional grounds since 1946, when it decided United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946). In the patchwork of opinions fashioned by a majority of the Court in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), only Mr.
Justice Black, concurring, suggested that the Attorney General's list was a bill of
attainder.
68 An uncommonly strict view as to the relevance of the past has recently been
taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lowenstein v. Newark Bd. of Educ.,
35 N.J. 94, 171 A.2d 265 (1961). In reversing the dismissal of a schoolteacher, the
court said: "[Questioning as to past affiliations and activities is not automatically
relevant and always permissible, but only so in the event of rational and reasonable
doubt of truth of denials as to the present in order to test such statements." Id. at
103, 171 A.2d at 269-70. And the court indicated that it would not let the exception
swallow the rule: despite "unorthodox" answers by the teacher and testimony that
he had been an active Communist in the 1940's, the court found "no rational and
reasonable doubt of truth of denials as to the present.'
69 Cf. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Gray v. Connecticut, 159
U.S. 74 (1895); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
7 0 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 9933 (McKinney 1961). The disability may be
removed by pardon or a certificate of good conduct from the parole board. The
constitutionality of the act as a whole was sustained in Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n,
116 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd mem., 347 U.S. 439 (1954).
71 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
72 See id. at 147-50.
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of the deportation provisions; 73 the "keeper of the arsenal" should not be
one who once eagerly awaited the Communist millenium, incited streetcorner
mobs to riot with his advocacy of violent action, or directed the organization
of the Communist Party in the United States. Or, to put a less extreme
case, it is tenable to argue, in terms of relevance, that school boards should
be able to deny employment to teachers with certain past unsavory
associations.74
The Supreme Court formulation by which this type of regulatory legis-
lation is judged, the "reasonable relationship" requirement of substantive
due process, 75 accepts the view that past conduct can be given present
significance by statute.76  Possible encroachment upon first amendment
liberties, while perhaps engendering a more diligent review than that given
to economic measures, 77 has not produced any articulated additional test
of substance which carries the inquiry beyond relevance; interference with
freedoms which is merely incidental to an otherwise valid regulatory
scheme is insufficient to void the statute,78 and this is so even though the
program is concerned with past as well as present speech or association.79
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this "balancing" test is a product
73 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251
(a) (5), (6), (7), (15), (16), (17) (1958) ; cf. 66 Stat. 183, 240, 261, 8 U.S.C.
§§1182(a) (15), (16), (17), 1424, 1451(c) (1958).
74 See Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485 (1952); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (holding the
Arkansas disclosure-of-association statute unconstitutional):
The question to be decided here is not whether the State of Arkansas can
ask certain of its teachers about all their organizational relationships. It is
not whether the State can ask all of its teachers about certain of their
associational ties. It is not whether teachers can be asked how many or-
ganizations they belong to, or how much time they spend in organizational
activity. The question is whether the State can ask every one of its teachers
to disclose every single organization with which he has been associated over
a five-year period.
Id. at 487-88. But see Lowenstein v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 35 N.J. 94, 171 A2d 265
(1961), discussed in note 68 supra.
75 See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1960) ; Barsky v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1954); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
190-92 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 494-95 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720-21 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390-93 (1950).
76E.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
77 Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958) : "When we deal with
the complex of strands in the web of freedoms which make up free speech, the opera-
tion and effect of the method by which speech is sought to be restrained must be
subjected to close analysis and critical judgment in the light of the particular circum-
stances to which it is applied," with Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955): "The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of the new requirement."
7sAmerican Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393-406 (1950).
79 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Borrow v. FCC,
285 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960) ; cf. Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
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of the Communist cases, which, since Dennis v. United States,80 have
consistently expounded a more pliable first amendment than that which
has been operative in other association and membership decisions. With
regard to deportation, another area in which retroactivity is not uncommon,
Congress has long been considered virtually omnipotent.81 The exercise
of this power does not have to meet even the reasonable relation standard,8
the Court being satisfied, except in instances of the most flagrant abuse
of power,8 3 to invoke the doctrine of inherent sovereignty.
One is left to inquire whether the feeble restraints on deportation and
the fluid due process test, diluted by the questionable presumption of con-
stitutionality,8 4 can be considered to be adequate safeguards in all circum-
80 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
81 See the language from Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-89
(1952), quoted in note 102 infra.
Every sovereign nation has power, inherent in sovereignty and essential
to self-preservation, to forbid entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see
fit to prescribe. Congress may exclude aliens altogether or prescribe terms
and conditions upon which they may come into or remain in this country.
Walter, Revising the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality,
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) (Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952), paraphrasing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659
(1892).
In developing his theory that the deportation power is properly a corollary of
the exclusion power-regulation of foreign commerce-Hesse traces and critically
examines the case law from the beginning, Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884),
to the present, Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957). See Hesse, The Con-
stitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-
1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959); Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the
Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power
To Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959). He contends that the concept of inherent
sovereignty is not firmly embedded in the early decisions, upon which the modern
cases rely. See The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE LJ. 1578, 1586-625 (1959). While
there are obvious differences between the scope of congressional control over aliens
and that which may be exercised by either the federal or state legislatures over citizens,
even the deportation cases, as will be developed later, are not inconsistent with the
theory that retroactivity has significant first amendment implications.
82 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584-91 (1952). The argument was
not even attempted in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), which sustained
deportation of an alien on the basis of a 1938 narcotics conviction. However, Mr.
Justice Douglas, in dissent, found support for his conclusion that the section violates
the ex post facto clause in the absence of any rational connection between the ground
for deportation and present fitness to remain in the country. Id. at 321 (dissenting
opinion).
83 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
84 See note 8 sipra. There is no doubt that the Court, at least in the Communist
cases, has retreated from the view that "the usual presumption supporting legislation
is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. . . . That priority gives
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (Rutledge, J.). See Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603 (1960) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Some have urged that
Congress' failure to give serious consideration to the constitutionality of legislation
affords little basis for the presumption. Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in
SUPREME COURT AND SUP'REMaE LAW 109, 122-29 (Cahn ed. 1954); Henkin, supra
note 49, at 637-38. Professor Frank notes that constitutional consideration was vir-
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stances 8 5 -whether there is a difference in terms of power between per-
missible prospective regulation of speech and association, and attempts to
reach similar conduct retroactively. It is the thesis of this Note that, in
certain circumstances, governmental prescription of present disabilities for
past conduct should be considered to violate the first amendment.
II. A THEORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS
Short of outright proscription of rights guaranteed by the first amend-
ment, the strongest inhibition to free speech and association is the un-
certainty which governmental attempts to effect otherwise legitimate ad-
ministrative and legislative goals sometimes generate. Though legislators
may labor to narrow the restraints imposed by a statute so as to avoid
impinging on the exercise of constitutional rights, language, by its very
nature, has only limited capacity to direct and inform conduct.8 6 If a
statute lies close to the constitutional border between protected and un-
protected behavior, some persons are likely to refrain from communications
and associations in which they would be protected by the Constitution.
When legislative language becomes dangerously imprecise,87 when it per-
tually nonexistent in the passage of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1958), and
the non-Communist affidavit provision of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(h), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 143 (1947) (repealed by 73 Stat. 525
(1959), 29 U.S.C. §. 159(h) (Supp. II, 1961)); it occurred during debates on the
McCarran Act, Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), as amended, 50
U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1958), but in a formalistic sense only. Frank, supra at 122-28.
And consider the following questions, put by Professors Hart and Wechsler in THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 93 (1953) :
In certain matters courts are content to accept as a basis of decision,
without further inquiry, a formally correct determination of the legislative or
executive branches. E.g., a statement that a certain statute has in fact been
enacted in accordance with the prescribed procedure, or that a certain govern-
ment is the established government of a country. . . . Why should they not,
in all cases, similarly accept the determination of Congress and the President
(or in the case of a veto, of a special majority of Congress) that a statute is
duly authorized by the Constitution?
Does Congress in voting to enact a bill or the President in approving it
actually make or purport to make such a determination? So far at least as
concerns questions of the validity of the statute as applied in particular situ-
ations, how can they?
Both Congress and the President can obviously contribute to the sound
interpretation of the Constitution. But are they, or can they be, so organized
and manned as to be able, without aid from the courts, to build up a body of
coherent and intelligible constitutional principles, and to carry public conviction
that these principles are being observed? In respect of experience and tem-
perament of personnel? Of procedure for decision? Of means of recording
grounds of decision? Of opportunity for close examination of particular
questions?
85 Many would answer that the Supreme Court's approach is deficient in any
circumstance. See, e.g., GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS; THE CONSTITUTION IN Ac-
TION (1960); MEllEioN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948) ; O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 HAiRv. L. REV. 1
(1952).
86 See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLum. L.
REV. 527, 528-29 (1947); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
87 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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mits a construction which transgresses the first amendment,8 8 the effect of
the restraint is more obvious-and more easily corrected. Repeatedly, the
Supreme Court has held that statutes which engender "self-imposed re-
striction[s] on free expression" violate the first amendment.
89
The operation of a retrospective statute raises other problems, because
the conduct with which such a statute deals has already taken place. No
verbal ambiguity can alter the course of past action which subsequent
judicial construction may hold to be covered or not covered by the
statute. However, the impact of legislation attaching current significance
to past acts cannot be assessed by looking solely to the immediate and
direct effects of a particular statute; there are broader consequences for
the present and the future when retroactivity in general is permitted. To
uphold such a method of dealing with speech and association currently
deemed undesirable unavoidably raises questions as to the future impunity
of a wide range of communications and affiliations. The effect of vagueness
in a prospective statute pales in comparison: not limited to conduct for
which, at some future date, disadvantage will be imposed, retroactivity
reaches every act that people think might eventually be proscribed. It is
no answer to say that all will be well if one adheres to currently acceptable
attitudes and patterns of behavior and if one obeys current legislation as
to what it is proper to say and with whom it is proper to join. History
teaches us otherwise. Society is far too fickle for this precept to furnish
a real sense of direction and security.
Today we deal with Communists or suspected Communists. In
1920, instead, the New York Assembly suspended duly elected
legislators on the ground that, being Socialists, they were disloyal
to the country's principles. In the 1830's the Masons were hunted
as outlaws and subversives, and abolitionists were considered
revolutionaries of the most dangerous kind in both North and
South. Earlier still, at the time of the universally unlamented
alien and sedition laws, Thomas Jefferson's party was attacked and
its members were derisively called "Jacobins." 90
The most severe manifestation of our anxiety about groups that deviate
from accepted attitudes and norms of behavior is some form of official,
formal condemnation. 9 ' Today, this is exemplified by control of "Com-
88 See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
89 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959); see, e.g., Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
90 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 150-51 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
(Footnotes omitted.) A more extensive historical review of these and similar efforts
to coerce conformity is found in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 148-66 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
91 Not surprisingly, the cleansing process is most evident during times of intense
national emotion and patriotism, such as during and immediately following war.
Those who had links with the South were penalized after the Civil War. See Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1867); Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418 (1868). The incredible hysteria
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munist-action," "Communist-front," and "Communist-infiltrated" organiza-
tions. 2 Admittedly, in many instances these are deviations of considerable
gravity, and outside the storm center other unorthodox segments of the
community are still relatively free to operate as they wish, unencumbered
by formal disabilities.93 Nevertheless, the sanctioning of retrospective as
well as prospective legislation endows what is today a limited regulatory
program with the power to spawn pervasive and undiscriminating con-
sequences: not only must one avoid associations which are currently sub-
ject to governmentally imposed disadvantages, but one should carefully
shun those which may lose favor with the next generation.
The danger of upholding legislation directed against past activity is
not that preferred freedoms 9 4 may be whittled away; it is that they may
be nullified. This danger, however, is not inherent in every retroactive
statute or regulation. Different circumstances may entail different degrees
of inhibition, and sometimes no inhibition at all. To identify the restraints
which may have a pervasive impact on constitutionally protected conduct
and which, according to the thesis of this Note, ought not to be permitted
under the first amendment, it is necessary to compare the status of an act
of speech or association at the time it was performed with the disadvantages
which are later attached to it by the governmental action in question. This
comparison may place the act in one of three broad classes.
(1) Legislation may deny benefits or impose some detriment because
of activity which was unencumbered when undertaken.9 5 This is the
clearest case of first amendment trangression. To sanction this principle
leaves no speech or association of the present fully protected from official
reaction to unknown crises in the future.
which swept America during and after World War I was in large part directed at aliens
and the foreign-born. See BIDDLE, THE FEAR OF FREmOM 62-67 (1951); ScHEMER,
THE WILsoN ADMINISTRATION AND CIvIL LIBERTIEs, 1917-1921, at 52-60 (1960).
In the early years of World War II, thousands of United States citizens of Japanese
descent were rounded up, relocated, and investigated with regard to their loyalty.
The Supreme Court upheld the action in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; see GELLHORN, AMERICAN
RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTION IN AcTiON 134-37 (1960); Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
92 See 64 Stat. 989 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 782(3) (a), (b), (4), (4A),
(5) (1958). For the general pattern of control, see Internal Security Act of 1950,
64 Stat. 987, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-857 (1958).
93 Thus, the John Birch Society, though hardly removed from the controversy,
is on the "right!' side of the storm and thus currently free to indulge a penchant for
character assassination as a part of its crusade against Communism.
94 See HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50-55 (1958); KAuPER, FRONTIERS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LIBERTY 37-41 (1956). Mr. Justice Frankfurter criticizes the use of
the "preferred position" formula, tracing the case-law development in Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949) (concurring opinion). Although recent cases
continue to remind us that first amendment rights deserve special protection, see
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), even in the loyalty area, Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of procedural due process to require taxpayer to take
loyalty oath before claiming tax exemption), there is no doubt, as far as the Com-
munist cases are concerned, that they are less preferred today than in the thirties.
See note 8 srupra.
95 See pp. 428-34 infra.
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(2) Legislation may impose a new detriment for conduct which was
subject to some penalty or control when it was undertaken.96 The deter-
minative factor should be the extent to which the detriment is increased
by the subsequent law, that is, whether the subsequent imposition is of a
magnitude sufficiently greater than the old that the prospect of similar
accretions would have a general deterrent effect on possibly protected
communications and affiliations which are otherwise undeterred by existing
legislative controls. If there is no such effect, patterns of conduct will be
unaltered, and no first amendment objection can be made beyond that
which may be applicable to the original restriction. But if the new
retroactive consequences are substantial, such a statute touches two
classes which deserve constitutional protection: first, those who, although
not actually subject to the comparatively minor extant consequences, may
restrict the scope of their action in an attempt to be quite certain that any
new and additional disability will not affect them and who, in the process,
would forego actions which may be protected by the Constitution; and,
second, those who acknowledge that their actions may be within the terms
of the current proscription, but who are willing to act anyway and, if
challenged, to defend their conduct on the ground that the statute interferes
with first amendment activity.9 7 In both situations, pressure is exerted on
people to avoid conceivably protected conduct rather than to risk unknown
but possibly substantial disadvantages in the future.
(3) Legislation may reestablish or merely restate the significance of
past conduct by attaching disadvantages of the same kind as those existing
at the time of action. 8 Although there are some cases involving statutes
of this description which afford an opportunity to contend that reinstituting
the penalty is so unfair as to violate due process,"9 the use of this sort of
96 See pp. 426-28 infra.
97 No doubt the "sit-in" demonstrators in the South are in this category. Would
their demonstrations against what they believe to be a denial of their constitutional
rights have been so well attended if they were threatened not only with light fines
and short jail sentences, but with indefinite future consequences, such as loss of all
rights to public employment, state pensions, and attendance at state-supported colleges?
Compare Garner v. Louisiana (82 S. Ct. 248, 263 (1961) (Harlan, 3., concurring).
98 See pp. 414-26 in!fra.
99 To penalize now because of a course of conduct or association long since
rejected raises serious questions of fairness. One might say that liberty is curtailed
without due process when an individual is denied the right to rescue himself from
former wrongs by positive action-action which at the time immunizes him from
the then existent disadvantage. Compare text at note 48 supra. An obvious example
is that of an alien subject to deportation in 1935 as a member of an organization advo-
cating overthrow of the Government. Had he disassociated himself in 1936, he would
have regained nondeportable status, inasmuch as present affiliation was then a requisite
to deportation. However, the act of 1940 made past members deportable, thereby
including him once again in this category. Despite the harshness of this sequence,
the due process argument was rejected in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
584-91 (1952). The contention has not been tested in nondeportation cases, where
constitutional restraints on congressional and state power remain-whatever their
inadequacies-far more meaningful. Of course, if it is constitutionally unfair in
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retroactivity ' 00 is unobjectionable when measured by the first amendment.
Knowledge that present permissible disabilities may be continued or, if
suspended, revived by future legislation should not force the surrender of
basic freedoms to any greater extent than do existing controls.
These three categories are of general applicability, regardless of the
substance of the statute in question. This is not to say that the details of
the official action are irrelevant. The statutory context may disclose infor-
mation about the possibility of successful challenge on the ground of retro-
activity, or it may contain a built-in test which itself can weed out much
that is objectionable about inquiry into the past.
Today, governmental action using retrospectivity is generally con-
fined to the areas of deportation, statutory employment qualifications, and
legislative investigations.1 1 Some special considerations apply to each.
The history of the deportation laws cautions us not to expect too
much from the judiciary when it is faced with retroactive legislation in
this area. Although many of the cases evoke our sympathies'O2 and al-
though recently the Court, perhaps similarly affected, has labored to con-
strue the statutes so as to arrive at some surprising but decent results,1
°3
cases of revitalization of penalties, the due process assertion has equal or more per-
suasive application in instances of increase of penalty or imposition of detriment on
previously uncontrolled activity. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232, 244-47 (1957).
100A statute which reinstates a former disadvantage may be described as not
retroactive at all. Mr. Justice Jackson so held in writing for the majority in Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-94 (1952) (alternative holding), discussed
in text accompanying notes 113-21 infra; cf. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951).
1 0 1 Another area where governmental retrospectivity may be a problem is that
of legislated annuities and pensions. Note the retroactivity permitted by the statutes
considered in: Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (Social Security), discussed
in note 66 supra; Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal
dimnissed, 365 U.S. 465 (1961) (forfeiture of benefits by anyone shown to the satis-
faction of the Veterans Administrator to be guilty of, inter alia, rendering assistance
to an enemy of the United States); Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp 590
(Ct. Cl. 1958) (retirement annuity not to be paid to anyone who has pleaded the
fifth amendment before a federal grand jury, court, or congressional committee).
This type of legislation may be distinguished by the apparent lack of regulatory
purpose in the subsequent disabilities. This being so, provisions which make acts
prior to the statute a bar to payments otherwise due fall dangerously close to the
prohibitions of the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses. See Steinberg v. United
States, supra. But regardless of whether these constitutional protections are available,
it is clear that insofar as the rights of speech and association are concerned, such
laws are potential weapons of abuse and should be subject to first amendment
limitations.
102 Indeed, the Court has offered its sympathy in some of these cases. See
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952), where the Court, affirming
action to enforce the statute, said: "That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after
long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense
and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign
state. Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we leave the
law on the subject as we find it." (Footuote omitted.) See also Jay v. Boyd, 351
U.S. 345, 357 (1956) ; In the Matter of Noland, 185 F. Supp. 948 (D. Neb. 1960).
103 See Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958) ; Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S.
115 (1957) ; United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) ; cf. Chaunt v. United
States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (denaturalization); Maisenberg v. United States, 356
US, 670 (1958) (same); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958) (same).
[Vol.llO :394
1962] RETROACTIVIY'Y AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 413
the rule seems to be that the deportation provisions are not bridled by the
Constitution.104  Decisions like Rowoldt v. Perfetto," 5 straining to read
the statutory provision as inapplicable to a past nominal member of the
Party, suggest that a breakthrough at the constitutional level may be in the
offing. Meanwhile, it is wishful thinking to expect resort to the first amend-
ment to save past innocent association from becoming grounds for present
deportation, should Congress so legislate.
In contrast, the existing constitutional standard of relevance enunciated
in the employment and professional qualification cases could, if strictly
applied, eliminate virtually all of the retroactive legislation presenting first
amendment problems in this field. To achieve this, several factors would
have to be carefully weighed in each case: the nature of the past conduct,
the length of time which has passed since the activity, the official position
regarding such action at the time it was undertaken, and the difference, if
any, between the community's opinion of the conduct then and now. If past
association or speech can be deemed relevant when viewed in the light of
these considerations, the danger of creating a precedent for restraints which
threaten the future exercise of first amendment freedoms will be minimal.' 0 6
The relevance test is not so helpful in the investigative context, where
legislators, of necessity, must review past conduct as a guide for the prepa-
ration of future laws. The great breadth of the typical legislative inquiry
will permit questions which overreach the lines drawn by this Note,
although diligent judicial supervision of the committees, to see that they do
not violate their authority or the announced scope of investigation, 0 7 may
help to reduce the frequency of such questions.
III. THE CASE LAW
Concern about past speech and association made retroactively illegal
is raised perhaps more by waves of security-prompted legislative investiga-
tions than by specific enactments imposing disabilities for once-legal con-
duct. Investigations which delve without apparent restraint into the pasts
of those who are brought before legislative committees may lead both laymen
and lawyers to conclude generally that statutes which do the same thing
are permissible. In addition, language by some of the Justices in recent
Supreme Court decisions suggests that the relevance-a narrow inquiry
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments-of remote conduct to present
regulatory interests is the major criterion by which the validity of govern-
mental action retrospectively attaching significance to that conduct is to be
104 See notes 65, 81 supra.
10 355 U.S. 115 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes 133-39 infra.
106 For an example, see the use of the relevance requirement made by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in overturning the dismissal of a teacher in Lowenstein v. Newark
Bd. of Educ., 35 N.J. 94, 171 A.2d 265 (1961).
1
0 7 See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961) ; Sweezy v. Nev Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
414 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110:394
judged. 0 8 Yet it is not too late to espouse a theory that statutes which
stigmatize speech and association retroactively may be invalid even though
the same activities might be prospectively prohibited. While the Supreme
Court has not acknowledged this thesis, it has, for whatever reasons, acted
consistently with it. In no case in this sensitive area has the Court upheld
a statute which imposed retroactively a significant and unforeseeable dis-
ability in the form of a job or professional disqualification, a withdrawal of
statutory benefits, or even deportation. At the same time, it must be
acknowledged that no statute has been struck down specifically because of
its retrospective effect on freedom of expression or affiliation.10 9 Rather,
due process of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments has provided
the basis for the invalidation of those enactments which, according to
the thesis of this Note, have offended the first amendment in their
retrospectivity." i0
To admit that avoidance of retroactive repression of freedoms of
speech and association has not been an articulated rationale for the decisions
is not to deny that a pattern of avoidance exists. The case has not arisen
in which naked retroactivity in the first amendment area has had to be the
sole determinant of invalidity, but in the decisions made and those carefully
not made the Court has gone to considerable lengths to ensure that the
statutes it has upheld have not condemned previously innocent speech or
association retroactively. In the main, whether or not this line has already
been drawn, there are strong indications that it will not be crossed.
A. Statutes Which Revitalize Penalties
1. Deportation
It is appropriate to begin a discussion of statutes which seem to be
unlimited in their retrospective operation with deportation, the area most
clearly established to be outside the specific constitutional restraints on
retroactive legislation. The Alien Registration Act of 1940"' made
formier membership in an organization which advocates violent or forcible
overthrow of the government a ground for deportation; prior law had
rendered an alien deportable only while he was a member of such an
organization." 2 In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,"i 3 the Court upheld
application of the new ground to aliens who had left the Communist Party
108 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961) ; Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951) ; Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952)
(dictum); cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). The nature
of the disability effected by the governmental action may also be considered. See
Konigsberg v. State Bar, .rpra at 52-53; text accompanying notes 238-41 infra.
10 But see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., con-
curring).
110 E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, mipra note 109, at 191.
111 Ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat 673.
12 Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 2, 40 Stat. 1012, Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S.
22 (1939).
i13 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
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before 1940. (The trial court had found that the Party advocated violent
and forcible overthrow of the United States during the period of the aliens'
membership.) Petitioners challenged anew the old doctrines that admis-
sion for permanent residence confers on an alien no vested right to remain
in the country,114 that ex post facto applies only to criminal sanctions,115
and that deportation is not punishment."i 6 With two Justices in dissent, i l 7
the Court refused to overrule these precedents." 8 Significantly, however,
the Court disposed of the challenge on ex post facto grounds by concluding
alternatively that the operation of the law was not, in fact, retroactive:
membership in any organization advocating overthrow of the Government
by force or violence had been a ground for deportation ever since 1920."1
Mr. Justice Jackson, for the majority, pointed out that these aliens "were
not caught unawares by a change of law. There can be no contention that
they were not adequately forewarned both that their conduct was prohibited
and of its consequences." 220
This conclusion, together with an observation that the Communist
Party had repeatedly been held to be one of the proscribed organizations,' 2 '
avoided much of the objection to retroactivity in the 1940 act. It also
foreshadowed the result in Galvan v. Press.'2 In that case, the Court
sustained deportation of former members under the Internal Security
Act of 1950,m which dispensed with the need to prove in each case
that the Communist Party was an organization advocating violent or
"14 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723-24 (1893) ; Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589, 610 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case).
"5 E.g., Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456 (1855); Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
116 E.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S.
585, 591 (1913). Compare Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
"17 Justices Douglas and Black, 342 U.S. at 598 (dissenting opinion).
"8 Id. at 595.
119 Id. at 593. The Court's reference here to 1920 rather than to the year of
the original statute (1918) may be to United States ex rel. Abem v. Wallis, 268 Fed.
413 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), the first judicial decision approving an administrative finding
that the Communist Party is an organization advocating the violent and forcible over-
throw of the Government. Or, the reference may be to the massive "raids" in New
England on January 2, 1920, the subject of the litigation in Colyer v. Skeffington, 265
Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920). Circuit Judge Anderson's conclusion that the Communist
Party was not an organization proscribed in the 1918 act was reversed in Skeffington
v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922).
120 342 U.S. at 593.
121 Ibid. See, e.g., note 119 .rupra; Murdoch v. Clark, 53 F.2d 155 (1st Cir.
1931); Antolish v. Paul, 283 Fed. 957 (7th Cir. 1922); United States ex rel. Fort-
mueller v. Commissioner of Immigration, 14 F. Supp. 484, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
In re Saderquist, 11 F. Supp. 525 (D. Me. 1935), affd mib niwm. Sorquist v. Ward,
83 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1936). But cf. Ex parte Fierstein, 41 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1930),
where the court was presented with grossly insufficient evidence, and refused to take
judicial notice of the character of the Communist Party. See also United States
ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 79 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F. Supp.
658, 661 (D. Mass. 1952) (Wyzanski, J.).
22 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
123 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 22(3) (C), 64 Stat. 1006 (now Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241, (a) (6) (C), 66 Stat. 204, as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (6) (C) (1958)).
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forcible overthrow of the Government. Although relying on the decision
in Harisiades,124 the Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, did not
discuss its statement in Harisiades that aliens who joined the party in early
years would not be "caught unawares" by a midcentury declaration that
their membership had been grounds for deportation since 1920; rather, it
seemed to decide only that invalidation of Congress' conclusive classification
of the Party and the consequences of membership in it was precluded by
the inapplicability of the ex post facto clause to deportation.125 However,
in disposing of Galvan's argument that he did not know the party was
dedicated to violence, the Court relied, as in Harisiades, on the almost
plenary power of Congress over the entrance and continued residence of
aliens. The Court's failure to discuss the merits of this argument suggests
that it concluded, without articulating, that the statutes in the two
cases were really identical; that the 1950 act did not establish--or even
make more likely to be proved-any ground for deportation which had not
existed under the old act. Furthermore, the Court's careful reading of
"member" in the new statute to mean more than nominal affiliation 126
makes it arguable that the Court found no practical retroactivity in the
1950 definition of the Party as a proscribed organization. The construc-
tion of "member" at least had the effect of eliminating any retroactive
application of new standards of affiliation which would be sufficient for
purposes of deportation. While holding petitioner's affiliation to be within
the meaning of "member" under prior statutes, the Court-over one major-
ity Justice's dissent ' 2 7 -- was at pains to demonstrate that no lesser affiliation
constituted membership within the meaning of the new act than under that
of 1940, and even that of 1918.128
124 347 U.S. at 530.
125 Id. at 530-31. The Court in Galvan did not discuss this alteration as the element
which, in a criminal case, would have brought the act within the ex post facto clause,
for although Party members had been consistently deported under the 1918 statute,
it appears that the new ease with which this could be done under the 1950 act would
fulfill Mr. Justice Chase's fourth definition of an ex post facto law in Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1789) : "Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, it order to convict the offender." (Emphasis added.)
However, although dispensing with the proof requirement lightened the Govern-
ment's work load in deportation cases, it is unlikely that the actual burden of proving
the case was substantially lessened. The Court left the burden of establishing mem-
bership the same, and there had been little trouble under the old act in establishing
that the Party was one of the proscribed organizations.
126 See notes 131-35 infra and accompanying text.
127 Mr. Justice Reed concurred in the judgment and in the opinion as written
except as to the deductions from legislative history about the outer limits of member-
ship. 347 U.S. at 532.
128 Id. at 526-28. The Court found nonexclusive the language of a clarifying
amendment to the act in 1951, Act of March 28, 1951, ch. 23, 65 Stat 28, which
explicitly provided for cases of affiliation so nominal as not to be deemed member-
ship: aliens who joined (1) when under sixteen, (2) by operation of law, or (3) to
obtain the necessities of life. Significantly, reliance was placed on language from
Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rez'd on other grounds sub norn.
Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922), quoted in note 132 infra, which
had been inserted in the record by Senator McCarran, the amendment's sponsor,
97 CONG. REc. 2373 (1951).
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If a desire to avoid or mitigate the rigors of retroactivity moved the
Court to this unnecessary demarcation of the outer limits of membership,
its summary dismissal of the implication of retroactivity raised by Congress'
renunciation of the requirement that the Party's purposes be proved in
each case could indicate that whatever retroactivity existed was considered
by the Court to be merely formal. It can readily be appreciated that if the
standards of what constituted membership had changed, the new law would
indeed have imposed a disability for past associations which were previously
unproscribed. On the other hand, it was not difficult to conclude that
making membership in the Communist Party a specific ground for deporta-
tion left the law as developed basically unchanged, the Party having con-
sistently been found to be within the disfavored class under prior statutes. 2 9
The least that can be said is that the result, if not the purpose, of the Court's
decisions in both Harisiades and Galvan was to construe the 1940 and 1950
acts as having no practical retroactive effect. The dictum in Harisiades
that the nature of the Communist Party had long been judicially recognized
set the stage for upholding a redefinition of the Party in Galvan; and
Galvan, also in dictum, added a gloss to the meaning of "member" which
tied the acts of both 1940 and 1950 to the standards of the 1918 act.130
Like Harisiades, Galvan's broad decision had its progeny, important
to the establishment of a complete pattern of nonretroactivity in deporta-
tion cases dealing with conduct on the periphery of first amendment
liberties. Although Galvan had held that membership within the meaning
of the statute did not require that the alien be fully cognizant of the Party's
advocacy of violence, it went on to say that nominal affiliation, established
unconsciously or by accident, would not suffice to deport.13 1 This standard,
established under the 1918 act132 and elaborated by Galvan, was stretched
considerably in order to reverse a deportation order in Rowoldt v.
Peretto,13 3 which held "meaningful association" 134 to be necessary-a
129 See note 119 supra; cases cited in note 121 supra.
130 There was, of course, no suggestion in Hariades that the 1940 act had
changed the standard of what constituted membership, inasmuch as the act merely
applied to former members of the Party the same sanction that had applied to present
members under the 1918 act. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 n.15
(1952). Moreover, Galvan's invocation of Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D.
Mass. 1920), rev'd on other grounds mb umn. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129
(1st Cir. 1922), emphasizes the fundamental continuity in the legislation. Galvan
v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 526-28 (1954).
'a' 347 U.S. at 527-28.
132 "Congress could not have intended to authorize the wholesale deportation of
aliens who, accidentally, artificially, or unconsciously, in appearance only, are found
to be members of or affiliated with an organization of whose platform and purposes
they have no real knowledge." Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 72 (D. Mass.
1920), rev'd on other grounds sub noin. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st
Cir. 1922). After the Supreme Court's use of Colyer in Galvan, see note 128 supra,
the case was followed in this particular in Bovinas v. Savoretti, 146 F. Supp. 274
(S.D. Fla. 1956).
133355 U.S. 115 (1957).
134Id. at 120. Compare United States v. Killian, 82 Sup. Ct. 302, 311 n.5, 312
(1961), where the Court approved a charge in a perjury prosecution under the
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criterion of apparently greater stringency than that laid down in Galvan.
Over a vehement dissent by four of his brethren, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
the author of Galvan, aided by this strained statutory construction, sum-
marily dispatched the case by finding the facts, indulgently viewed, too
different from those in Galvan to require detailed comparison of the two
cases. 135 In the next case, however, Niukkanen v. McAlexander,5 6 the
Court sustained a deportation order-Mr. Justice Frankfurter joining the
dissenters in Rowoldt to constitute the majority ' 3 7-- by a per curiam opin-
ion which indicated that the Court was unwilling to be the tribunal for
further developing the jurisprudence of "meaningful" membership. 3 8
It may well be that Rowoldt was but a brief excursion to a position
where the elements of deportable membership are viewed more narrowly
than they were in the "saving" dictum in Galvan, a journey unnecessary
to prolong, but serving to underline a basic continuity of standards between
the old and new statutes. Whether or not Rowoldt attempted to set a new
standard, it demonstrated vividly that not every former association with
the Communist Party is a ground for deportation, and served to imbed
the dictum of Galvan into the law surrounding the 1950 statute. This
having been achieved, the per curiam disposition of Niukkanen left the
finer lines to be drawn-as they were under the older acts-by the lower
federal courts. 39
It may be that to suggest a conscious attempt by the Court to avoid
retroactive repression of previously unproscribed association is to glean too
affidavit provision of the Labor Management Relations Act, see note 164 infra, that
"membership . . .connotes a status of mutuality between the individual and the
organization . . . [, a] desire on the part of the individual to belong to the Com-
munist Party and a recognition by that Party that it considers him as its member."
The Court sanctioned refusal of an instruction that the acts offered to show member-
ship must indicate agreement with "the illegal purposes or objectives of the communist
party as distinguished from mere cooperation with it in lawful activities." Id. at
319 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
135 355 U.S. at 121. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, persuasively argued that
setting aside the deportation order here could not be reconciled with the Court's holding
in Galvan. Id. at 122. But even he did not contend that the 1950 act demanded
different standards than its predecessors. Indeed, he claimed that the standards
were the same under both acts, and that Galvan had maintained those standards.
Id. at 123 n.4. See also Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mass. 1952) (Wyzan-
ski, J.).
136 362 U.S. 390 (1960) (per curiam).
1
3 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dictum in Galvan concerning the outer limits of
membership had already been used by one district court before he had elaborated
upon it in Rowoldt. Bovinas v. Savoretti, 146 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
138 Although the majority predicated their position on the special competence of
the trial judge to evaluate the credibility of the testimony concerning the defendant's
affiliation with the Party, four Justices from the Rowoldt majority dissented, finding
the facts indistinguishable from those in Rowoldt. 362 U.S. at 394 (dissenting
opinion). The difficulty which most of the Justices have in distinguishing Galvan,
Rowoldt, and Niukkanen may explain why the Court, after what appears to have
been an inadvertent demarcation of the issue's poles, has abandoned the task of
resolution to the lower courts.
139 Compare Bovinas v. Savoretti, 146 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Fla. 1956), with
Grubisich v. Esperdy, 175 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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much from the cases. Nevertheless, it can scarcely be denied that practical
retroactivity-if it ever existed-has been read out of the statutes. That
there is no retroactivity in fact can be stated; that it has been intentionally
avoided is arguable. Inasmuch as it is well established that Congress may
rely on past activities to effect the deportation of aliens,140 hesitancy to
permit retroactivity in these cases may be based on an unarticulated
belief that there was more at stake than mere unfairness in unexpected
deportation.141
2. Public Employment
Disqualification from gaining or continuing public employment has
not enjoyed--or suffered-the long history of litigation as to constitution-
ality that has surrounded deportation. Perhaps as a consequence, despite
Mr. Justice Holmes' unfortunate aphorism about the policeman, 42 the
area has not become enmeshed in formalisms that disqualification can never
be punishment ' 43 or that because an employee has no vested right in his
job he has no rights at all.144 Disqualification from public employment
differs from deportation in that the demanded qualifications may be ex-
amined for a reasonable relationship to the interest which the Government
seeks to promote.145  But a reasonable relation is easy to find,146 and
seldom are legislatures so unsophisticated as to make patent the punitive
design of a statute depriving persons of employment.147  The present
relevance of past conduct cannot be dismissed lightly; assuming the perti-
nence of the associations and activities about which inquiry may be made,
those of the past can often provide a proper base from which a full assess-
ment of an employee's or applicant's fitness may be launched. In addition,
while few, if any, of the Justices would consider public employment to be
140 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32
(1924); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (The Chinese Ex-
clusion Case).
141 Compare Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at
533 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 601 (Douglas,
3., dissenting).
142 See note 60 supra.
143 Compare United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), with Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721-23 (1951). Compare United States v. Lovett,
supra, and Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, mupra, with Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302 (1955).
144 Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), with Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581, 589, 610 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case).
145 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 601 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
Compare Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), with Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
146 See the discussion of Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in note 66
supra; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958). Compare Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d
666 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960).
147 See Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 844, 845-46 (1954). Compare Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 731 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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a mere "privilege" which legislatures may treat as they will,148 it is clear
that constitutional limitations on the state and federal governments in this
area do not assume that any person has a "vested right" to a public job.1 49
Public service, like deportation, falls in a category generally not
reached by the specific constitutional prohibitions of retroactive legislation.
The limitations which do apply have been articulated in terms of due
process restraints on arbitrary governmental action,15 but the Court has
displayed a marked deftness-more noticeable than in deportation-at
avoiding retroactivity in the statutes and oaths which it has been willing to
uphold. Conversely, there has been obvious retroactivity in those statutes,
oaths, and inferences which the Court has refused to permit.151 Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works 152 sets the tone for the statutes and oaths affecting
association and speech which the Court has sustained. In that case, al-
though Mr. Justice Burton dissented specifically on unconstitutional retro-
activity,153 the Court held valid a requirement that present and prospective
city employees swear that they were not, and had not been, within five
years preceding the establishment of the oath, members of any organization
advocating the violent or forcible overthrow of the Government.154 Find-
ing a reasonable relationship between the city's regulatory interest and the
oath imposed, the Court, through Mr. Justice Clark, took great care to show
that the test oath requirement only changed the form of an existing
legislative stricture: seven years before the test oath requirement was
imposed, the city's charter had been amended to prohibit the continued or
future employment of anyone belonging to an organization advocating
violent or forcible overthrow of the Government. 1 55  Challenged on ex
post facto grounds, the validity of the oath was placed squarely on the
prior charter amendment and the relation of the oath to that amendment.15
Both were found to proscribe the same conduct during the same period of
148 While the term was invoked in Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, smpra note
147, at 722 (criticised in a concurring opinion, id. at 725), and in Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952), it is clear that the state's power to grant and with-
hold employment is not absolutely unqualified. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952). Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
149 See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-99 (1961); United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See also
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1951) (concurring opinion).
While there is no "vested right" to a particular job, significantly greater concern
is evident when the governmental action threatens continued practice of a chosen
trade or profession. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; Homer v. Rich-
mond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
150 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
151 See cases cited note 150 supra.
152341 U.S. 716 (1951).
153 Id. at 729.
15 4 Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 94004, § 3, Oct 21, 1948.
'55 Cal. Stat 1941, ch. 67, at 3409 (Charter of Los Angeles, § 432).
156341 U.S. at 720.
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time ' 57 -a relationship not unlike that found in Harisiades between the
Immigration Act of 1940 and its predecessor.
158
The emphasis in Garner on nonretroactivity has been a recurrent
feature in the opinions of the Court which have sustained oaths, 159
presumptions, 16 0 and inquiries 161 about associational activity. Although
the Court has occasionally said that past memberships are relevant to
present qualifications,162 this kind of language has appeared only in opinions
dealing with proscriptions of present associations, and no case has held
that employment may be denied because of past activities which were
permissible when engaged in.
The statute upheld in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,les
refusing access to the NLRB to unions whose officers had not taken
expurgatory oaths regarding affiliations with subversive groups, dealt with
disavowal of present associations,'" as did the Maryland oath for candi-
dates for public office 165 in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors.166  Similarly,
157 The charter amendment became effective on April 28, 1941, and provided that
no person should be retained or be eligible for public office or employment in the
City of Los Angeles who, after the effective date of the enactment, became a member
of an organization advocating the overthrow by force or violence of the government
of the United States or that of California. Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 67, at 3409 (Charter
of Los Angeles, § 432). The subsequent Los Angeles city ordinance required all
office holders and employees to take an oath before January 6, 1949, that they had
not been members of such an organization within five years prior to the 1948 ordi-
nance. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 94004, § 1, Oct. 21, 1948. The original charter
amendment itself had a five-year retrospective provision, but this was not before the
Court. 341 U.S. at 720.
158 See notes 111-21 supra and accompanying text.
159 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) ; American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
160 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
161 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) ; Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). But see
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
12 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra note 161, at 52; Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720
(1951) ; cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
IN 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
164 Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (1947). The
act prohibited the Board from entertaining the petitions of any union whose every
officer had not, within the previous twelve months, executed an affidavit that "he is
not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he
does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes
in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any
illegal or unconstitutional methods." (Emphasis added.) See Killian v. United
States, 82 Sup. Ct. 302, 304-05 (1961). The section was repealed by the Labor Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 525. See also
§ 504(a) of the latter act, 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (Supp. II, 1961),
which provides, inter alia, for disqualification from holding union office or a labor rela-
tions consultant position while a member of the Party or for five years thereafter.
This disqualifying provision of the 1959 act has not yet been tested.
1 6 5 MD. ANN. CODE art 85A, § 15 (1957), Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76
A.2d 332, appeal dismissed as moot, 340 U.S. 881 (1950).
106 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
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New York's Feinberg Law, 1 67 which applied to public school teachers, on
its surface dealt only with present activities; the act was upheld in Adler
v. Board of Education,16 with Mr. Justice Burton, who had dissented
from what he considered to be Garner's retroactivity,'" among the major-
ity. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Adler (on the ground that the
case and statute were not ripe for review) was based in part on what he
felt to be an inability to determine whether the proscriptions of the act
applied to past or present associations-an uncertainty as to whether in
operation the statute's application would be limited to present associa-
tions.
170
In Lerner v. Casey,171 Mr. Justice Harlan, for the Court, emphasized
that the inquiries which the New York subway conductor had refused to
answer concerned whether he was "then" a member of the Communist
Party; 172 Lerner's discharge as a security risk was sustained. Retro-
activity was likewise absent in Nelson v. Los Angeles County,' 3 where
petitioners' dismissal from public employment was justified by their
"insubordination" in refusing to answer questions put by a congressional
committee after they had been ordered to cooperate with the committee
both by their superiors and by statute; not only had the inquiry been
limited to present associations, but the state statute under which they were
dismissed 174 defined "insubordination" so as to include only refusals to
answer questions regarding past activities within a period of time when
such activities were, by a separate statute,175 grounds for dismissal. 176
Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ.,177 whose acceptance of "incompetency"
as cause for dismissal sired Nelson's "insubordination" holding,178 did turn
167 N.Y. EDuc. LAWS § 3022.
168 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
169 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 729 (1951).
170 342 U.S. at 507: "Again, the Rules seem to indicate that past activities of
the proscribed organizations or past membership in listed organizations may be enough
to bar new applicants for employment. But we do not know, nor can we determine it.
This, too, may make a difference," citing Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716, 729 (1951) (Burton, J., dissenting in part).
171357 U.S. 468 (1958).
172 Id. at 471. See also id. at 474.
173 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
174 CAL. GOVT CODE § 1028.1.
175 CAL. GOVT CODE § 1028.
' 76 The oath in force at the time of the facts which gave rise to Nelson, CAL.
GOVT CODE § 1028.1, provided for discharge for any failure to answer questions about
past knowing membership "at any time since September 10, 1948," presumably to
confine the time period within the scope of § 1028, which was added by Cal. Stat.
1947, ch. 1418, § 1, at 2976. Subsequently, the oath was amended to extend the time
period back to October 3, 1945. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2106, § 1, at 3731. This amend-
ment confines the oath carryback to a period covered by yet another statute, CAL.
GoVr CODE § 18200, passed in 1945.
177 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
178 362 U.S. at 7. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), was also cited as con-
trolling Nelson, another factor indicating that the Court in Nelson did not think
itself faced with a question of retroactivity or remoteness. See note 172 supra and
accompanying text.
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on a chain of events begun by a question as to specific past Communist
activity. In this respect the case is not immediately reconcilable with the
cases before and after it which upheld tests of only present subversive
association. The question which Beilan's superintendent asked him had
related to supposed Communist affiliation and activities in 1944, before
any Pennsylvania law made such association a disqualification from em-
ployment.179 But in upholding Beilan's discharge, the Court made clear
that it did not consider the question as having any independent significance,
since, by his refusal, Beilan indicated that he would not answer any similar
question relating to his associations-past or present. 8 0  Moreover, the
Court (speaking through Mr. Justice Burton, who, it will be recalled, had
dissented in Garner from what he believed to be a sanctioning of retro-
activity 181) pointedly said that Beilan had not even challenged the questions
put to him on grounds of remoteness.
8 2
In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 88 a five-Justice majority, categorically
asserting that there are no "absolutes" in the first amendment,'84 gave
the appearance of having abandoned the concern for avoiding retroactivity
which was so evident in Garner and Beilan. Broadly citing those cases
as holding that "the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness of the
employee for the post he holds" outweighs "the interest in not subjecting
speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure," 185 the
Court seemed to suggest that any past speech and association may be a
valid ground for repressive sanctions if an adequate "interest" can be
found. Under the presumption of constitutionality which a majority of the
Court now entertains, 8 6 it would seem that an adequate interest must be
found unless there is something in the statute in question specifically to
179 Pennsylvania's first provision for the discharge of teachers in the "security
area" was passed in 1949, and was at that time part of the law under which Beilan
was discharged for "incompetency." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (1950). The
clause "advocation of or participating in un-American or subversive doctrines" was
deleted from this act, as of March 1, 1952, by Pennsylvania Loyalty Act § 16, Pa.
Laws 1951, act 463. The Loyalty Act provides its own sanctions-and an oath
requirement. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§211-25 (1959).
1 8 0 When Beilan refused to answer the specific question posed, he also announced
he would "decline to answer any other 'questions similar to it,' 'questions of this type,'
or 'questions about political and religious beliefs . . . ."' 357 U.S. at 401.
181 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 729 (1951).
182 357 U.S. at 405: "Petitioner is not in a position to challenge his dismissal
merely because of the remoteness in time of the 1944 activities. It was apparent
from the circumstances of the two interviews that the Superintendent had other
questions to ask. Petitioner's refusal to answer was not based on the remoteness of
his 1944 activities. He made it clear that he would not answer any questions of the
same type as the one asked. Petitioner blocked from the beginning any inquiry into
his Communist activities, however relevant to his present loyalty." Cf. Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 114 (1959). Compare Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468,
471 (1958).
183 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
184 Id. at 49.
185 Id. at 52.
' 8 6 See note 84 supra.
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rebut it.:17 But Konigsberg's unrestrained language need not determine
the issue of retroactivity; the case was squarely placed on Beilan,8 8 and
this may well be sufficient for present purposes, since Konigsberg's refusal
to answer the bar examiners' questions, like Beilan's, was premised on
what he believed to be the constitutional impermissibility of any such
questions, rather than on the remoteness of some of them.'8 9 To make
Beilan controlling in Konigsberg, as the Court did, does not require reading
the earlier case broadly; as far as retroactive condemnation of a past exer-
cise of freedom of association is concerned, the facts of Konigsberg do not
remove that case from the scope of a narrowly read Beilan-a Beilan
consonant with the meticulous avoidance of retroactivity in Garner. Care
must be taken, however, that no subtle accumulation of a body of dicta
condoning unqualified inquiry into past uninhibited associations obscures
what the Court has actually decided to date. Unfortunately, Konigsberg
manifests a blurring of the issue when decision on inquiries into the past
is unnecessary and consequently unconsidered. 190
The only federal case to come near presenting the Court with the issue
posed by the state cases is Bailey v. Richardson,91 where discharge of a
federal employee for security reasons 19 2 was grounded on certain un-
revealed information obtained through investigations of the employee's
associations. Without referring to whether the evidence which was
adduced before the federal agencies related to past or present activities,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained the discharge
over an impassioned dissent by Judge Edgerton. 93 The Supreme Court,
equally divided, affirmed. 94 Since no explanation was given as to the
temporal relevance of the evidence which allegedly gave reason to question
Miss Bailey's loyalty, and since the major issue before the court of appeals
187 Compare Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), discussed in note 66 .supra.
188 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 53-56 (1961). There was also an
additional problem with the burden of proof-whether the petitioner or the bar
examiners should bear it. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), was distinguished.
366 U.S. at 53-56.
189 366 U.S. at 38 n.1. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 306 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
190 Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). See also Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
191 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
192 Under Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
193 182 F.2d at 66. The majority's conclusion-"that the President, absent con-
gressional restriction, may remove from Government service any person of whose
loyalty he is not completely convinced . . . without assigning any reason and without
giving the employee any explanatory notice," id. at 65-was recently echoed in
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894, 898 (1961), although the Court
there made clear that a "patently arbitrary or discriminatory" reason would be un-
acceptable, as might be one which stigmatized the employee as disloyal. Id. at 898.
"That is, unless the government official is foolish enough to admit what he is doing
-and few will be so foolish after . . . [this] decision-he may employ 'security
requirements' as a blind behind which to dismiss at will for the most discriminatory
of causes." Id. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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was lack of confrontation, 195 it cannot be said that the case detracts from
the general conclusions that can be drawn about the Supreme Court's
avoidance of the retroactive proscription of organizational ties. 196 Clearly,
the possibility that the court of appeals may have known of underlying
inquiries into past associations 197 cannot make Bailey-concerned as it is
with confrontation-precedent for unqualifiedly permitting dismissal to be
predicated upon investigation into prior lawful associations. Furthermore,
it must be noted that the investigations in Bailey may have had sufficient
relevance to the standards of the Hatch Act of 1939 198 to avoid the vice of
retroactivity, since that act prohibited federal employment of members of
any political party or organization advocating the overthrow of the Govern-
ment.19 9 Perhaps the most notable feature of Bailey is that it demonstrates
that the import of retroactivity as a distinct kind of infringement of first
amendment liberties has not received full articulation by either courts or
counsel.
The public employment cases, while primarily focused on the reason-
ableness of the specific legislation in each case as a means of achieving a
legitimate governmental goal, have not shown the Court to be unaware of
the dangers inherent in the retroactive prescription of disabilities for
activities in the past. The care taken in Garner to avoid retroactivity is
in itself significant; subsequent emphasis on the fact that those inquiries
which have been sustained were addressed to present conduct heightens
the significance. Only Konigsberg failed to differentiate specifically between
past and present associations, and it is clear that no member of the Court
in that case thought past activities to be the issue.2 00
195 See 182 F.2d at 65. Miss Bailey had also been barred from government
service for three years. This part of the discharge proceedings was held invalid as
a bill of attainder, 182 F.2d at 55, citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
196 However, support for a theory that retroactivity has been avoided is hard
to glean from those cases in which federal discharges have been invalidated through
construction of the statute involved or on procedural grounds. E.g., Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) ; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) ; Cole v. Young,
351 U.S. 536 (1956) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; cf. Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474 (1959).197 The evidence before the two loyalty review boards indicated that Miss Bailey
had been an active and leading member of the Communist Party in the District of
Columbia from about 1935 to 1943. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Con-
stitution of the United States, 33 B.U.L. Rav. 176, 177 (1953).
1'sAct of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9A, 53 Stat. 1148 (repealed by the Act of
Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 690, § 4, 69 Stat. 625).
19 The executive order authorizing the regulations which led to Miss Bailey's
dismissal, 5 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1949), also provided for the Attorney General's listing
of subversive organizations to aid in policing the Government's loyalty program.
Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947). Organizations, including the
Communist Party, to which Miss Bailey allegedly belonged or had belonged, were
listed pursuant to the order. 182 F.2d at 49-50. Compare the discussion at notes
121-29 .rupra of the legislative determination for purposes of deportation that the
Communist Party is an organization advocating the violent or forcible overthrow of
the government.
200While four members of the Court vigorously dissented, they did not ad-
dress themselves to any retroactive or remote aspects of the questions asked. Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56, 80 (1961). These justices, however, have not
been insensitive to remoteness in other instances. See Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 197 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244-46
(1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, 3., concurring).
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There may be granted, as has been done with regard to deportation, a
largely uninhibited power within legislatures, both state and federal, to
control their own housekeeping. Although the protections of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments may be more generously applied to mollify the
impact of the sovereign on citizen-employees than in the case of aliens, one
may accept the idea-assuming no patently discriminatory classifications
are employed-that in general governments need not justify their firing
practices in each individual instance. But the exercise of this power may
not be predicated on grounds which, through retrospective imposition of
disabilities and hardships for past conduct, threaten to constrict the free
exercise of first amendment rights in the future.
B. Statutes Which Create Disadvantages Different From Those Existing
at the Time of Action
Deportation, as the archetype of those retrospective impositions which
have almost formalistically been held to fall outside the strictures of the
ex post facto clause, demonstrates the license with which harsh and
retroactive legislation may operate when there is no threat to the continued
exercise of fundamental freedoms. Marcello v. Bonds 20 - is a recent and
striking example. The petitioner, legally resident in this country since the
age of eight months, had been convicted of a single violation of the
Marihuana Tax Act 202 in 1938, when one offense was not grounds for
deportation. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, however, not
only made one such conviction sufficient cause for deportation,203 but
authorized deportation on the basis of a conviction obtained before its
enactment.20 4 With only one of the three dissenting Justices attacking the
ex post facto effect of the act,20 5 the Court sustained Marcello's deportation
under the 1952 law. This statute, as applied to Marcello, is a marked
example of a new and substantial disadvantage imposed for past conduct;
but, as usual, the majority dispatched the ex post facto challenge on the
ground that deportation is not punishment.20 6 Otherwise, the clause would
have been clearly applicable.
20 7
The new imposition in Marcello was so substantial that, if it could
have been anticipated, it might have changed the offender's course of con-
duct. While a law's effect on voluntary action does not determine the
201349 U.S. 302 (1955).
202 Ch. 553, § 6, 50 Stat. 553 (1937) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2591).
203 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1958).
20466 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1958).
205 349 U.S. at 319 (Mr. Justice Douglas).
206 Id. at 314, citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), and Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
207 In a criminal context, even reducing the jury from twelve to eight has been
held ex post facto as applied to one whose crime had been committed in the time
of the twelve-man jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). See also Duncan
v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (dictum).
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applicability of the ex post facto clauses2 08 a different view may be taken of
retroactivity when there is added to the inequitable treatment of an in-
dividual a threat to the continued exercise of first amendment lib-
erties.209 Had, for example, Marcello's early offense been picketing to
secure union recognition 210 or the abolition of the draft,211 subsequent
classification of his conduct as a ground for deportation would be such an
alteration of the disabilities which may possibly be attached to conduct on
the periphery of the first amendment that future similar activities would
be appreciably curtailed. Conduct willingly undertaken at the risk of
incurring present disabilities might be overwhelmingly deterred by the
prospect of unforeseeable consequences. Assuming that aliens may be
prospectively forbidden to engage in certain activities on the border of the
first amendment, the retroactive establishment of significant disadvantages
for having engaged in the same activities would remain unacceptable be-
cause of the virtually unlimited effect of the possibility of similar impositions
in the future upon the continued exercise of free speech and association.
On the other hand, new regulations which may come close to trespass-
ing on freedom of speech and association may be so insubstantial by com-
parison to those in force at the time of action that no course of conduct
would have been altered by the prospect of them; likewise, the threat of
similar retroactive regulations in the future which apply to currently
proscribed activity should not generate any anxiety not already produced
by the existing sanctions. Flemming v. Nestor 212 is a case in point. A
1954 amendment to the Social Security Act 213 provided for the termination
of old-age benefits payable to aliens deported after its enactment for certain
causes under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.214 Nestor, who
began receiving benefits in 1955, was deported after the amendment, but
his deportation was based on his having been a member of the Communist
Party from 1933 to 1939. Deportation on this ground was one of the
causes for which benefits could be cut off.215  Over the dissent of four
208 Such an effect is not a prerequisite to invoking the ex post facto clause, see
note 207 supra, nor, on the other hand, is it necessarily sufficient, see Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ; Mahler
v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); cf. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case) (alien left country with certificate to readmit
him; all certificates cancelled in his absence).
209 Compare Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting);
id. at 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600
(1952) (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
210 See the discussion of the arrests during bitter labor disputes at California
shipyards in 1934, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1957).
211 Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
212 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
213 68 Stat. 1083 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1958).
214 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958).
215 Section 202(n) of the Social Security Act, added by 68 Stat. 1083 (1954), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1958), specifies that benefits shall be terminated for
those deported under § 241 (a) (6) (C) (i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 66 Stat. 205, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (6) (C) (i) (1958).
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Justices, the Court upheld the termination of Nestor's payments. Viewing
this action as regulation within the Social Security scheme rather than as
an adjunct of the deportation laws,2 16 the majority was able to conclude
that the statute was not an attempt to punish for past disfavored conduct.
217
In fact, the Court's opinion, by Mr. Justice Harlan, relegated to footnote
Nestor's contention that his first amendment rights were being violated;
because they saw the termination of benefits as flowing from deportation
rather than from prior Communist affiliation, the majority disposed of the
first amendment argument as merely a collateral attack on the original
deportation order.
218
If the majority's conclusion that the withdrawal of Nestor's benefits
was a regulation reasonably related to the operation of the Social Security
scheme can be accepted, the decision seems constitutionally unimpeachable.
If, as the majority also decided, the cutoff did not deprive Nestor of an
accrued property right,219 and was not punishment which should fall
before the ex post facto clause or the requirement of a judicial trial,
220 its
retroactivity could be challenged only from a first amendment perspective.
It is in this area that the statute's reasonable relation to other admittedly
valid legislation should not have saved it if past associations would thus
become the basis for substantial disadvantages which could not have been
anticipated.2 21  However, the addition to existing sanctions of the loss of
Social Security benefits would hardly seem to be such an increase of the
preexisting disadvantage of deportation that, if foreseen, it would have
deterred the conduct in question. The added disability in Nestor for
previously proscribed association is not incompatible with the generaliza-
tion that in the area of first amendment liberties-in contrast to those non-
first amendment situations represented by the facts in Marcello-the Court
has not permitted retroactive impositions which would have been likely to
have altered the course of action which was in fact take.
222
C. Statutes Which Affect Previously Innocent Conduct
The element of retroactivity is a significant feature of those cases in
which the Court has held inferences drawn from, or inquiries into, past
216 363 U.S. at 611-12. See note 66 supra.
217 Id. at 617. See note 36 supra.
218 Id. at 613 n.7, 619-20.
219 Id. at 608-11.
220 See id. at 617.
221 See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra. Note that it is irrelevant that the
new disability is considered a consequence of the old disability rather than a new
sanction against the underlying offense. In the Nestor situation, then, the Court's con-
clusion that termination of benefits flowed from deportation rather than from Congress'
displeasure with the conduct for which deportation was imposed, 363 U.S. at 619,
should not suffice to sustain the statute if it would alter conduct on the first amend-
ment periphery.
222 The comparison must be made to the line of cases following Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), see notes 152-57 supra and accompanying text,
and that following Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), see notes 223-28 infra
and accompanying text, inasmuch as only Nestor has presented the issue in the context
of a new disability imposed for previously proscribed conduct.
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associations to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus Wienun v. Upde-
graff 223 invalidated, in the absence of a scienter requirement, an Oklahoma
test oath 22 4 which required teachers to disavow past membership in certain
organizations. In contrast to Garner, there was no prior Oklahoma law
dealing with those past activities which the oath was intended to uncover.,22 5
Mr. Justice Clark, for a unanimous Court, distinguished Garner, Adler,
and Gerende on the ground that in those cases the statutes implicitly made
disqualification turn on knowledge of the organizational purposes of the
groups in which membership carried the sanction of unemployability.22 6
The opinion clearly manifests a concern with the legislation's inhibiting
effect on the future exercise of first amendment freedoms,2 2 7 and, in fact,
Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion found a bill of attainder in the
resurrection of the five years preceding the taking of the oath.228
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners m 9 the Court was again
confronted with a disqualifying inference drawn from past membership in
the Communist Party at a time when membership entailed no similar
disadvantage-when in fact the party enjoyed a place on New Mexico's
ballot.22 0 The case differs from Wiernan only in that the inference in
Wientan was drawn automatically from a refusal or inability to take the
exculpatory oath, while in Schware the inference was drawn by a board of
examiners from an admission of past membership. The decision in
Schware did not turn on scienter alone, as it had in Wieman, but also on
the impermissibility of resting a conclusion that the applicant presently
lacked good moral character upon Party ties which had been severed
fifteen years earlier.2 31 The cases are similar in that the inference in
=2344 U.S. 183 (1952).
224 Okla. Sess. Laws 1951, tit 51, ch. 1, §§ 1-9.
= See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951). Compare
Wienan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (concurring opinion). Similarly,
the Florida statute which the Court unanimously upset in Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275 (1961), called for an oath by public employees "that I
have not and will not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Com-
munist Party," FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (Supp. 1960). Although the oath require-
ment, enacted in 1949, Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25046, § 1, was preceded by a 1941 law
making criminal the advocacy of "doctrines that existing form of constitutional govern-
ment should be overthrown by force or violence or by any other unlawful means
.. . FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.01 (1944), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.01
(Supp. 1960), there was no prior law referring to the Communist Party as such,
and in any event, as the Court noted, the oath requirement looked back into "the
unending past," 82 Sup. Ct. at 280, not just to 1941. The opinion, however, relied
principally on the unconstitutional vagueness of the words "aid, support, advice, counsel
or influence": "could anyone honestly subscribe to this oath who had ever supported
any cause with contemporaneous knowledge that the Communist Party also supported
it?" Ibid. See generally, as to the relationship between the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine and the first amendment, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1961).
226 344 U.S. at 188-91.
227 Id. at 190-91.
2
2
8 Id. at 193.
229 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
2
3
0 Id. at 244 rn14.
23-d. at 243-46.
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Schware and the classification in Wieman were both founded on the same
unconstitutional assumption, and in both cases the operative conduct had
carried no detrimental consequences at the time in question.
Outside the arena of "security" legislation, the Court recently struck
down an Arkansas statute requiring all teachers, as a condition of em-
ployment, to disclose every organization of which they had been members
or to which they had contributed money within the last five years.2 32
Shelton v. Tucker,23 3 while acknowledging the right of a state to make
some inquiries into a teacher's extracurricular activities,23 4 invalidated the
statute because of its "unlimited and indiscriminate sweep." 235 Thus
the Court did not reach the question whether, had it not been overbroad,
the statute must fall as a retroactive imposition of a disadvantage for past
lawful affiliations. However, although the majority was apparently satis-
fied that even the prospective operation of such a broadly drawn statute
would be invalid, it may be argued that the element of retroactivity was
itself a constitutional infirmity.23 6 On the other hand, it is at Shelton that
one approaches the magic line between formally imposed disabilities and
informal consequences collateral to disclosure; there was no valid law in
Arkansas prohibiting the employment of teachers whose affiliations evinced
an endorsement of racial integration.23 7  Implicit in the position taken by
the four dissenters is a distinction between outright prohibition of certain
associations-or disqualification for having previously engaged in them-
and mere compulsory revelation without specific consequences; 238 the
232 Ark. Acts 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1959, No. 10.
233 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
234 Id. at 485, 487-88.
235 Id. at 490. Accepting, as it did, the possible relevance of such inquiries to
legitimate state interests, the Court's invalidation of the statute was rested on the
broad constitutional principle expressed in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
304 (1940): "In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." See text
following note 93 mupra; cf. Wolfe v. City of Albany, 104 Ga. App. 264, 121 S.E.2d
331 (1961), in which a state court of appeals held unconstitutional a city ordinance
requiring, inter alia, an applicant to show that he never belonged to any "Com-
munistic" organization before he may be licensed to solicit members for any dues
paying association. The decision, which found the ordinance to be an unreasonable
exercise of the police power, was rested on both state and federal free speech pro-
visions.
236 Compare Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275 (1961), dis-
cussed in note 225 supra; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
23
7 Ark. Acts 1959, No. 115, passed in the same year as the statute before the
Court in Shelton, did make it unlawful for any member of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People to be employed by the state of Arkansas or
any of its subdivisions. The trial court in Shelton held this law invalid under the
fourteenth amendment, at the same time that it sustained the disclosure provision
which the Supreme Court subsequently overturned. Shelton v. McKinley, 174 F.
Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark. 1959), rev'd sub norn. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
2 3 In an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, the four dissenting justices stated in
general terms that "information about a teacher's associations may be useful to school
authorities in determining the moral, professional, and social qualifications of the
teacher, as well as in determining the type of service for which he will be best suited
in the educational system." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 498 (1960) (dissenting
opinion). In an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which all the dissenting
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case was so explained when these Justices captured a majority in Konigs-
berg, 9 where the Court found no specific disadvantage necessarily con-
sequent to disclosure.
240
This importance to some members of the Court of officially imposed
disadvantages flowing from a state or federal inquiry is evident in the cases
on legislative investigations, where questions as to past unproscribed asso-
ciations have been approached differently than in the context of public
employment or admission to the bar.
241
Before these cases are discussed, one premise should be made explicit.
There is a significant distinction between the power to legislate per se
and the power to investigate in areas of legislative competence: Congress
may investigate where it may properly legislate,242 but the scope of inquiry
-assuming its pertinence to a proper legislative goal-need not be con-
fined to the narrow terms of the statute to which an investigation may
give rise. A congressional investigation of previous criminal conduct in
order to enact more effective controls upon interstate racketeering is not
likely to be considered a serious retrospective hardship on a former
offender who is questioned-even though formal punishment of such distant
conduct would be dearly unconstitutional.243  While the witness may be
exposed to public scorn, it may be doubted that the threat of such a dis-
advantage in the future would deter conduct already proscribed by the
Justices joined, a specific justification was suggested for the Arkansas law: "Presum-
ably, a teacher may have so many divers associations, so many divers commitments,
that they consume his time and energy and interest at the expense of his work or
even of his professional dedication." Id. at 494. The act's scrutiny of associations of
the prior five years weakens the force of the dissenters' assertion of relevance, as do
the questions regarding contributions. Insofar as disadvantages may attend revealing
certain associations, the statute clearly conflicts with the protections of the first amend-
ment. Here may lie the division in the Court; the majority foresaw disabilities
flowing from revelation-explicitly in the possibility of publication, id. at 486, sub
silentio in the possibility of discriminatory firing, see id. at 485 n.5. The dissent
refused to read this into the statute, preferring to decide that case if and when it
should arise. Id. at 499.
239 366 U.S. 36, 53 (1961). The Konigsberg majority suggested that in Shelton
there was the possibility that the state might be afforded the opportunity for imposing
"undetectable arbitrary consequences upon protected association." Ibid.
240 Ibid. Insofar as the inquiries are directed at present activities, these Justices
might also conclude that even though "an angry public opinion, and the evils which
it may spawn, are relevant considerations in adjudging . . .the validity of legis-
lation that, in effecting disclosure, may thereby entail some restraints on speech and
association, the existence of an ugly public temper does not, as such and without
more, incapacitate government to require publicity demanded by rational interests
high in the scale of national concern." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 102 (1961). The majority there makes very clear that
the only question properly before them concerned the registration provisions of § 7
of the act, 64 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 586 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 786
(1958). Id. at 70-81. That section is addressed to current activities only. Id. at
86-87.
241 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128 (1959).
242 Id. at 117-22.
M Compare Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1958), which
requires, under threat of contempt, the testimony of any witness before any grand
jury or court of the United States examining possible violation of certain narcotic
statutes. The privilege against self-incrimination is replaced by a pledge of immunity
from prosecution.
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criminal laws. However, investigations in the area of speech and asso-
ciation have inevitably turned their pressure upon persons whose past
conduct is likely to have been within the protection of the first amendment.
While the deterrent effect on a given witness, as contrasted with the
ex-racketeer, is not unimportant, the effect may reverberate far beyond the
witness and constitute a considerable inhibition-though admittedly weaker
than that posed by retroactive legislation-to the continued exercise of first
amendment rights.
244
Although the earliest investigation cases in the area of national security
were consistent with an avoidance of retroactive condemnation of past
speech and association, the cases have failed to develop a pattern which
parallels that found in the decisions on job disqualification or deportation.
Watkins v. United States 245 and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 4 1 invalidat-
ing contempt convictions on broad first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment
grounds, necessarily obviated any objections to the retrospective nature
of the questions which had there been asked.24 7  Language in Watkins
that legislative investigations impose hardships not unlike those inflicted
by legislative disqualifications from employment,248 and that "this effect is
even more harsh when it is past beliefs, expressions or associations that
are disclosed and judged ... ," 249 suggested that the investigation cases
might develop consistently with the Court's practice of avoiding retro-
activity in the area of speech and association. Three of the four subsequent
cases can be so reconciled.250  But Barenblatt v. United States,2 51 a further
refinement of Watkins, seems to permit congressional investigators to
reach into the past even where the conduct made subject to inquiry lies
244But cf. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), holding constitutional
the Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1958). The Court held that, while the
immunity conferred upon a witness required to testify before a federal grand jury
investigating threats to national security from espionage might not secure him against
all disabilities consequent to his testimony, the demands of the fifth amendment were
sufficiently met by the promise of immunity from formal prosecution. Id. at 430-31.
While the Court did not attempt to delineate the exact scope of the statute's pro-
tection, it did note the right of a witness faced with sanctions of any type to claim
that they are criminal in nature. Id. at 431. In view of the majority's continued refusal
to consider the most likely disabilities-loss of job, passport ineligibility, deportation,
public scorn-as punishments, this right would seem illusory. It must be noted, how-
ever, that insofar as the demanded testimony goes to prior criminal activity, the
decision's implicit condonation of additional sanctions for already proscribed conduct
does not vitiate the thesis that the first amendment would bar the assignment of
similar disabilities to previously legal activities in the realm of speech and association.
245 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
246354 U.S. 234 (1957).
247 Watkins was asked whether several of his past associates had been members
of the Communist Party. 354 U.S. at 178, 185. Sweezy was asked about prior con-
tacts with Communists. 354 U.S. at 234, 242.
248 354 U.S. at 197-98.
2 4 9 Id. at 197.
250 See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959). Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), can be included in
this group inasmuch as the unanswered question reviewed by the Court went to
membership which appears to have been virtually contemporaneous with the in-
vestigation.
251360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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on the periphery of the first amendment and was not proscribed when it
was undertaken
2 52
With the wisdom born of hindsight, one can view Barenblatt as fore-
shadowed by the various positions of the Justices in earlier investigation
cases.253 More clearly, it seems to be the fruition of Mr. Justice Clark's
dissents in SweeZy 25 4 and Watkins. 25 5 In neither case did he find infringe-
ment of first amendment rights or problems raised by questions regarding
past activities and associations.256  Most significantly, he drew a distinction
between the informal stigma, scorn, and obloquy that result from exposure
in a legislative investigation and the disgrace and hardship that accompany
loss of a job as a security risk; 2 57 it was clear to him that Watkins and
Sweezy did not pose the same problems that faced the Court when he wrote
the opinion invalidating Oklahoma's test oath in the Wieman case.
258
That this distinction may be determinative for a majority of the Court
was recently implied in Konigsberg, in which Mr. justice Harlan drew a
line between disclosures which themselves result in specific disabilities, and
revelations which do not necessarily result in harmful consequences.
259
This line, while far from convincing as a means of deciding Barenblatt in
the first place,260 is appealing insofar as it may serve to limit that case to its
facts; that is, even if Barenblatt has foreclosed the issue of retroactivity
in legislative investigations, to distinguish between officially imposed dis-
abilities and informal disadvantages would preserve the disqualification-
disbarment-deportation area free from similar retroactive impositions with
respect to speech and association. Certainly Barenblatt should remain
limited to legislative investigations and should not be transplanted into
those areas where directly imposed governmental disabilities flow from in-
2 Although Barenblatt refused on first amendment grounds to answer any
questions regarding associational activities or political beliefs, cf. Beilan v. Board
of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958), the Court made decision on past membership
inquiries part of the case by its statement of the issue. 360 U.S. at 126.
253 Thus, Mr. justice Frankfurter limited his concurrence in Watkins to the
inadequate notice given the petitioner as to the relevance of the questions asked, 354
U.S. at 217; and he and Mr. justice Harlan confined their concurrence with the result
in Sweezy to New Hampshire's inadequate interest in ascertaining the petitioner's
relationship to and knowledge about the Progressive Party, which could not be
classified along with the Communist Party as a threat to the security of New Hamp-
shire. 354 U.S. at 266.
254 354 U.S. at 217.
25 354 U.S. at 267.
256 Id. at 268; 354 U.S. at 231-32.
257 354 U.S. at 232. Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52-53
(1961) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 499 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
258 Neither on grounds of scienter, as he explicitly states in Sweezy, 354 U.S.
at 270, nor in the effect on the individual of exposure in an investigation, see Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. at 232 (by implication).
259 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1961). Three members of the
Court find this distinction untenable. Id. at 72-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
260 To conclude that Congress or state legislatures might do indirectly that which
they could not do directly would not be unlike the formal distinctions which resulted
in unrestrained retroactive legislation in the deportation area, distinctions to which
the Court seems to consider itself bound. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31
(1954).
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criminating answers or discoveries about associations. The specific dis-,
ability cases have not yet held past unproscribed associations to be grounds
for present disqualification, and it is arguable that Barenblatt has not fore-
closed the issue even in investigation cases, inasmuch as the facts of
Barenblatt were not unlike those of Beilan261 and Konigsberg,2 2 where
refusal to answer all questions about past associations implied refusal to
answer any questions as to present associations.2 63 Broad language in
Barenblatt appears to do more,264 as does careless language in Konigs-
berg; 26 5 but in fact the question has not yet had to be faced; such dicta
should not obscure the issue which survives.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court has not expressly acknowledged that the
first amendment prohibits retroactive government action which is likely to
have a marked inhibitory effect upon the future exercise of the rights
guaranteed by that amendment, the Court's decisions do display a pattern
which is consistent with this thesis. Its demonstration must await the
future. Meanwhile, one may hope that an analysis of the issue-believed
to be an integral, if only tacit, issue in the cases-may provoke more
authoritative attention.
It should be clear that if a majority of the Court intends to espouse a
"balancing" test by which to determine whether freedoms of speech and
association may be curtailed in order to promote certain governmental
interests, there must be conscious weighing of all the elements that con-
stitute the freedom whose restriction is thought to be necessary. Merely
because a consistent minority objects to any inhibition of what they
would denote the first amendment's preferred freedoms does not mean
that the majority, having rejected that stand, is free to "balance" without
considering when there is a change in the nature and consequences of the
restraints employed.2 6 6 To say that certain instances of speech and asso-
ciation may be prospectively curtailed withdraws now defined areas from
the first amendment's protection. But this is only a limitation; there is
nullification implicit in retroactive condemnation. The inherent lack of
discrimination in retroactivity cannot be remedied by current precision of
2 61 See text accompanying notes 177-82 mspra.
262 See text accompanying notes 188-90 supra.
2 68 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 114 (1959) : "[P]etitioner objected
generally to the right of the Subcommittee to inquire into his 'political' and 'religious'
beliefs or any 'other personal and private affairs' or 'associational activities,' upon
grounds set forth in a previously prepared memorandum, which he was allowed to
file with the Subcommittee." In his memorandum Barenblatt attacked the jurisdiction
of the committee to ask him any questions or to conduct any inquiry at all, based on
the first, ninth and tenth amendments, the prohibition against bills of attainder, and
the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 114, n.2.
264 See note 252 supra.
265 366 U.S. at 44.
266 See note 94 supra.
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statutory language, inasmuch as the hates and fears of the future may not
seek catharsis in suppression of the same discordant elements as are the
target of current anxieties. More is involved here than inequity. Inequity
is inherent in any retroactivity. But where speech and association are
concerned, the overriding consideration is the atmosphere of utter and
immediate uncertainty generated by the possibility of retroactivity tomor-
row, supported by precedents laid down today. No legitimate goal of
democratic government can justify the blurring of what is and what is not
proscribed today, and of what will be and what will not be suppressed
tomorrow.
W.B.P.
M.L.S.
